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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
De laatste jaren is de interesse in deugdelijk bestuur sterk gestegen, mede door de 
bedrijfsschandalen die wereldwijd opdoken (denk maar aan Enron, Parmalat of Lernout & 
Hauspie). Binnen deze context werd de aandacht vooral gevestigd op de impact van de raad 
van bestuur, aangezien deze één van de belangrijkste interne bestuursmechanismen is voor 
bedrijven. Echter, ondanks deze verscherpte aandacht, is er nog steeds erg weinig empirische 
duidelijkheid over wat de betrokkenheid en doeltreffendheid van raden van bestuur 
beïnvloedt, laat staan wat hun effect is op bedrijfsprestaties. Bovendien werd er vooral 
gefocust op de controlerende taak van een raad van bestuur, terwijl dit bestuursorgaan ook op 
andere vlakken kan bijdragen. De externe bestuurders kunnen via hun dienstenrol additionele 
kennis toevoegen, toegang verschaffen tot belangrijke bedrijfsmiddelen, hun netwerk ter 
beschikking stellen en ook de reputatie van het bedrijf verhogen door hun aanwezigheid. Dit 
takenpakket van de raad van bestuur werd tot nu toe weinig bestudeerd, zeker binnen jonge 
hoogtechnologische bedrijven. Ook al hebben deze ondernemende start-ups het potentieel om 
aanzienlijk bij te dragen tot innovatie-ontwikkeling, werkgelegenheid en regionale 
ontplooiing, toch worden ze geconfronteerd met de nadelen inherent aan nieuwe en kleine 
ondernemingen. Daarnaast bestaat het top management team vaak uit managers komende uit 
hetzelfde netwerk, wat resulteert in homogene kennis in termen van opleiding, ervaring en 
vaardigheden. In deze context zijn externe bestuurders via hun engagement in de dienstenrol 
uiterst waardevol. 
Na de algemene inleiding, worden in de volgende hoofdstukken drie empirische studies 
gepresenteerd, die meer inzicht verschaffen in de dienstenrol van de raad van bestuur voor 
hoogtechnologische starters. 
 
De eerste studie onderzoekt hoe conflicten tussen de externe bestuurders en de leden van 
het top management team de dienstenparticipatie kunnen beïnvloeden. De resultaten tonen 
aan dat taak-gerelateerde discussies een positief effect hebben en dat persoonlijke 
meningsverschillen nefast zijn voor de betrokkenheid van de raad van bestuur in hun 
dienstenrol. Daarnaast zien we ook dat taak-gerelateerd conflict kan overgaan in relationeel 
conflict, dewelke een indirecte negatieve invloed heeft op de dienstenparticipatie. 
 
  
 x 
 
De tweede studie focust op de determinanten die de doeltreffendheid van de dienstenrol 
zullen beïnvloeden. Ten eerste is het belangrijk dat het top management team over een 
bepaald absorptievermogen beschikt, waardoor de managers het advies van de raad van 
bestuur kunnen bevatten. Vervolgens is het een must om voldoende meetings te organiseren, 
omdat kennis het meest efficiënt wordt overgedragen via rechtstreekse contacten. Tenslotte 
toont deze studie aan dat zowel structurele als contextuele factoren belangrijk zijn om het 
diensten-engagement van de raad van bestuur te verhogen. 
 
De derde studie licht uit hoe het human capital van de externe bestuurders een sterke 
meerwaarde kan bieden en in welke mate dit de performantie van de hoogtechnologische 
starter beïnvloedt. De resultaten tonen dat bedrijven die een technologiestrategie nastreven, er 
baat bij hebben om hun raad van bestuur anders te structureren in vergelijking met bedrijven 
die een marktstrategie volgen. We zien dat de specifieke ervaring, diversiteit en 
mandaatperiode van de externe bestuurders belangrijke determinanten zijn van de bedrijfs-
performantie bij jonge hoogtechnologische starters. 
 
Het laatste hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de voornaamste bevindingen en gaat dieper 
in op de theoretische en praktische contributies van deze doctoraatsthesis. Tot slot worden 
ook de beperkingen van dit doctoraat besproken en geven we suggesties voor toekomstig 
onderzoek.  
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CHAPTER I 
General introduction 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
In recent years, the interest in corporate governance has increased significantly, not least 
due to several worldwide corporate scandals, of which the Enron case (2001) must be the 
most notorious example. By means of extensive accounting constructions and setting up over 
a thousand subsidiaries, the executive management of this large American organization made 
disappear millions into their own pockets, despite the controlling mechanisms that were put in 
place (Coffee, 2002). Similar situations emerged in Europe: Parmalat (Italy) and Ahold (the 
Netherlands), as well as Lernout & Hauspie (Belgium) created a stir, accordingly raising 
awareness of the risks of poor corporate governance (Enriques & Volpin, 2007). 
Consequently, as public confidence was lost, many corporate governance codes were set up or 
reformed in order to rebuild trust. 
 
The term corporate governance is used to indicate how an organization can be led in a 
good, efficient, and responsible way. It is about who and what really count and the recent 
crises provided a shift in focus from shareholder supremacy to the significance of several 
groups of stakeholders. Hence, corporate governance is not only about distributing value 
among different actors, but also about creating value, hereby improving firm structures and 
continuity (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Huse, 2005). 
 
Within this larger field, major emphasis has been put on the board of directors as it is one 
of the main internal governance mechanisms available to the firm (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 
2003), influencing corporate outcomes and thus creating value for the firm, its actors involved 
and society at large (Pearce & Zahra, 1991; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Huse, 2007). Nevertheless, despite this increased attention, most of the 
recommendations concerning the board of directors has emphasized formal board structures 
and characteristics. In particular, mainstream board research largely relied on incomplete 
quantitative models, investigating the direct relationship between board composition and firm 
financial performance (Daily, et al., 2003). However, these input-output studies provided no 
evidence on the processes and mechanisms linking these input and output variables 
(Pettigrew, 1992). As Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) indicated, “living up to the formal 
standards is not enough” (p.462). Actual board behavior should receive more awareness, as 
there is still little empirical evidence on how the board of directors really operates and 
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functions, nor what determines the board’s participation or effectiveness, and how these 
concepts relate to firm performance (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona 
& Zattoni, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the primary focus has been on the monitoring aspect of the board of directors 
(e.g. John & Senbet, 1998; Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005), as it is associated with agency 
theory, the dominant theoretical perspective in board studies (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & 
Johnson, 1998). Agency theory expects the board to monitor the executive management, in 
order to ensure maximization of shareholders’ wealth (Masson, 1971). However, as the recent 
scandals revealed the importance of stakeholders rather than shareholders, a broader board 
governance perspective was reintroduced. Next to evaluating and controlling how well a 
company is run, the board of directors may also carry out additional tasks. In general, three 
board tasks are posited: control, service and strategy (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The strategic 
task is related to the formulation of corporate goals and policies as well as the allocation of 
resources necessary to implement the board’s strategies (Hung, 1998). This strategic task can 
be treated as a separate construct (e.g. Stiles & Taylor, 2002) or incorporated within the 
control and service tasks (e.g. Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The board service task comprises a 
range of subtasks which all have a different theoretical basis (Hung, 1998). Table 1-1 
provides an overview of the most important academic studies pertaining to these service 
aspects and their underlying theory (as suggested by Machold & Farquhar, 2013). 
 
Table 1-1 Board service task definitions 
Authors 
Board service 
task stipulation 
Theoretical 
framework 
Description of the specific board 
service activities 
Zahra & Pearce 
(1989) 
service role 
resource 
dependency 
theory 
- obtaining external resources 
- enhancing firm legitimacy 
- linking the firm with the external environment 
Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand (1996) 
service strategic choice 
- advising the top management team on 
managerial issues 
- formulating the firm’s strategy 
resource 
dependency 
resource 
dependency 
theory 
- representing external stakeholders 
- enhancing firm legitimacy 
Forbes & 
Milliken (1999) 
service task (unspecified) 
- providing advice to the top management team 
- active participation in strategic decision-
making 
Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis (2003) 
service and 
advice role 
stewardship 
theory 
- advising the top management team 
- initiating the firm’s strategy  
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Hillman & 
Dalziel (2003) 
provision of 
resources 
resource 
dependency 
theory 
- offering expertise and advice 
- linking the firm to important stakeholders 
- providing access to resources 
- building external relationships 
- helping with strategy formulation 
- enhancing legitimacy 
 
Through its engagement in its service tasks, the board of directors may provide resources 
essential for company performance, open up their personal networks as such acting as a 
boundary spanner, and enhance the organization’s legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Hence, the board is more than just a controlling entity; also its service tasks 
are vital for long-term decision-making and subsequently corporate performance (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). 
 
Additionally, corporate governance codes and conventional board research have 
principally relied on large listed companies, whereas the vast majority of companies are 
unlisted, small and medium-sized firms, encompassing a wide range of businesses, i.e. start-
ups, single owner-manager firms, family businesses, private equity-owned firms, joint 
ventures and subsidiary companies (EcoDa, 2010). These companies did not yet attract the 
full attention of regulators or researchers, despite their large number and economic 
significance, and the importance of board members in supporting the company towards 
corporate success (Long, Dulewicz & Gay, 2005). Therefore, a contextual approach to 
understand boards will be compulsory (Huse, 2000). Indeed, given their different ownership 
structure and distribution of power between internal and external stakeholders, the board 
functioning of small private firms will be distinct compared to large listed companies 
(Fiegener, Brown, Dreux & Dennis, 2000; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002). Moreover, the board 
control task will be diluted given the lack of separation of ownership and control (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999), as such increasing the importance of the board’s service tasks (Huse, 1990; 
Daily & Dalton, 1992). 
 
In this light, a new stream of research is emerging, acknowledging that the “research 
fortresses surrounding board studies” should be taken down (Daily, et al., 2003; Gabrielsson 
& Huse, 2004). By applying a broader board theoretical perspective, these scholars strive to 
understand the dynamics and diverse tasks of the board of directors, in different contexts, as 
such bridging the gaps between theory and actual board performance. Hence, this doctoral 
dissertation aims at contributing to this promising stream of research, by going further than 
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merely studying the impact of the “usual suspects”1, by investigating the antecedents and 
outcomes of the board’s service tasks, specifically in early stage high-tech firms. 
 
1.2. FOCUS OF THE DISSERTATION 
Given that board governance deserves more attention in smaller unlisted companies, this 
dissertation specifically focusses on the context of early stage high-tech firms. Early stage 
high-tech ventures operate in high-tech sectors, are not more than 10 years old, and have no 
single external shareholder holding a majority stake (Burgel & Murray, 2000; Burgel, Fier & 
Licht, 2004). These ventures are in transition, evolving into more stable organizations over 
time, often aiming at reaching an initial public offering (Filatotchev, Toms & Wright, 2006). 
In this setting, boards of directors and particularly the outside board members, are of great 
importance. Although entrepreneurial high-tech firms have the potential to contribute 
significantly to innovation, job creation and regional development (Venkataraman, 2004), 
they are faced with liabilities of newness and smallness (Henderson, 1999). Imagine two 
entrepreneurs, both technical specialists, but rather inexperienced in terms of business 
activities. In this situation, it may be highly relevant to add skilled industry professionals to 
the board in order to assist the company on a long-term basis (Bjornali & Gulbrandsen, 2010). 
Hence, this doctoral research seeks to demonstrate the added value brought by the outside 
board members. Outside board members are no members of the top management team (TMT), 
their associates or families, no employees of the firm or its subsidiaries, and no members of 
the immediate past top management group (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Throughout this 
dissertation, we refer to this group of directors as the “outside board”. 
 
Furthermore, the engagement of outside boards in their service tasks may be particularly 
important in an entrepreneurial environment (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003; Knockaert & 
Ucbasaran, 2013). Primary, they have the necessary expertise in order to give advice (e.g. on 
the company’s business model, purchasing policies or pursued strategy) as such bridging the 
encountered resource dependencies related to the often homogeneous knowledge base of the 
TMT (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Garg, 2013). Moreover, having the experts’ support can 
increase the company’s reputation and legitimacy as they open up their personal networks 
(Pfeffer, 1972), which may help attracting customers, suppliers or investors to go into 
                                                 
1
 The “usual suspects” are the classic indicators, i.e. insider/outsider ratios, board size, CEO duality and 
ownership, providing no understanding of how boards can contribute to organizational value creation 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). 
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business. Finally, these firms operate in a highly uncertain and changing environment 
(George, Zahra, Wheatley & Khan, 2001), which requires a regular source of external 
knowledge (Dees & Hill, 1996). This dissertation deliberately concentrates on the entire set of 
service tasks – as opposed to the added value of specific outside board members – in order to 
validate this theoretically identified construct.  
 
Finally, through their engagement in the service tasks, outside boards become an important 
asset in helping entrepreneurial TMTs to gain access to new and complementary resources 
(Shenkar & Li, 1999). Indeed, compared to their counterparts in large and established 
organizations, outside board members in early stage high-tech firms are even more actively 
involved (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002). As a result, it is argued that research on the outside 
board should be integrated with studies on the TMT (Pettigrew, 1992), which definitely holds 
in an early stage high-tech environment where both decision-making bodies are no standalone 
entities (Nielsen, 2010), and can even be considered part of the extended TMT (Zhang, Baden-
Fuller & Pool, 2011). Hence, while focusing on the outside board service tasks, this 
dissertation also incorporates the TMT into the board perspective. Given that little empirical 
research is conducted on the interplay between the (outside) board and the TMT, particularly 
in early stage high-tech settings (Bjornali, 2014), this area of research remains an emerging 
field, leaving much to explore. 
 
This doctoral research expands on how the outside board can create value for early stage 
high-tech ventures, regardless of the type of country regulations. Nevertheless, we 
deliberately target entrepreneurial high-tech firms in Belgium. Belgium is an export-driven 
economy and has relatively large levels of R&D intensity (2% of GDP), targeting at an 
increase towards 3% by 2020. What innovation is concerned, Belgium is seen as an 
“innovation follower”, with an innovation performance above the European average (EC, 
2011). Belgian companies can choose between several legal forms, such as sole 
proprietorship, general partnership, limited partnership, private limited liability company and 
private/public limited corporation. Specifically, only the latter category has the legal 
obligation to establish a board of directors, with no less than 3 board members in place who 
meet at least once a year. Moreover, the structure is based on a one-tier model, where both 
executive and non-executive directors form the board of directors. Although rarely preferred, 
new corporate legislations permit the board to delegate several tasks to a “management 
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board”, as such allowing to operate as a two-tier model2. Additionally, Belgian companies 
have a predominantly controlled ownership structure and the country has a significant 
presence of small (listed) companies (Allen & Overy, 2012). What corporate governance is 
concerned, there is a general corporate governance code for listed companies, just as “Code 
Buysse” for non-listed companies. As in the other member states of the EU, these codes 
incorporate the national corporate governance traditions and practices as well as European 
directives and recommendations. Moreover, Belgium is a forerunner in a number of aspects, 
for instance in the field of legal provisions related to director remuneration (Allen & Overy, 
2012). 
 
1.3. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION STUDIES 
Figure 1-1 shows the graphical representation of the three dissertation papers, aiming at 
providing a better understanding into the service tasks of the outside board in early stage high-
tech ventures. 
 
Figure 1-1 Dissertation framework 
 
  
                                                 
2
 In a two-tier board system, there is an executive board (for the executive directors) and a supervisory board 
(comprising all non-executive directors). 
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While focusing on extended TMT characteristics and behaviors, both service involvement 
(study 1) and service effectiveness (study 2) are addressed, as well as the relation with firm 
performance (study 3). A combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal information is used 
to cover the specific research questions below. 
 
Particularly, a quantitative research design was carried out. First, through the public 
database Bel-First
3
, we determined all early stage high-tech firms
4
 in Belgium. Subsequently, 
we sent out a letter to the identified CEOs introducing our research and notifying them that 
we would call to schedule an appointment. Finally, hand-collected information was gathered 
by means of a structured interview with the CEO of the ventures who were willing to 
cooperate. Although the studies are presented in a different order, the data collection was 
conducted in a sequential way: the third study was based on a total sample of 179 early stage 
high-tech firms, composed in 2011-2013, whereas 195 early stage high-tech firms were 
identified for the first and second study, for which the data collection took part in 2011-2014. 
Due to different waves of data collection, the sample size of the three dissertation studies 
might slightly differ. Response-rates were fairly high, with 57%, 64%, and 62% of the CEO’s 
participating in the first, second, and third study respectively. Additionally, we also asked the 
TMT and outside board members to fill in an online survey, which allowed us to verify the 
answers provided by the CEO. This procedure resulted in a unique hand-collected dataset, 
rarely seen in corporate governance research. 
 
1.3.1. Study 1: Top management team and outside board as communicating vessels in 
reaching outside board service involvement: A conflict study 
This study examines the interpersonal dynamics between the outside board and the TMT in 
explaining outside board service involvement. Specifically, the focal point of examination is 
task conflict between the TMT and the outside board. Task conflict refers to differences of 
opinion about the content of the tasks being performed (Jehn, 1997), which may be 
particularly important in an early stage high-tech environment (Amason, Shrader & Tompson, 
2006). The outside board sees discussions and constructive task disagreements with the TMT 
as a means to get acquainted with and to fully comprehend firm-specific situations (Johnson, 
et al., 1996; Castanias & Helfat, 2001). Thus, when open discussions with the TMT are 
                                                 
3
 Bel-First contains general, financial, and board-related information on every Belgian company. 
4
 Early stage high-tech firms operate in high-tech sectors, are not more than 10 years old, and have no single 
external shareholder holding a majority stake (Burgel & Murray, 2000, Burgel, Fier & Licht, 2004). 
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encouraged, the outside board is better able to perform its service tasks (Conger, Lawler & 
Finegold, 1998). Additionally, next to this direct effect, TMT – outside board task conflict 
might also indirectly impact outside board service involvement. Indeed, task conflict may 
spill over into relationship conflict, i.e. disagreements on personal issues reflecting feelings of 
resentment (Simons & Peterson, 2000), as such influencing the outside board service 
involvement in an indirect way. Accordingly, while adopting a conflict perspective, the first 
study provides a clear understanding of how task conflict between TMT and outside board 
impacts outside board service involvement, both directly and indirectly, i.e. through the 
mediating effect of TMT – outside board relationship conflict. 
 
1.3.2. Study 2: A learning and attention based view perspective on outside board 
service effectiveness in early stage high-tech firms 
Next to understanding what outside boards do, it is important to investigate the 
effectiveness of their service interventions. Outside board members may assist the 
entrepreneurial TMT in gaining access to new knowledge and complementary capabilities 
(Kroll, Walters & Le, 2007). However, the degree to which the engagement of the outside 
board in its service tasks helps to bridge the deficiencies within the TMT will depend on how 
this external knowledge is internalized. By taking a learning perspective, this paper examines 
the conditions under which service-related interventions by the outside board are considered 
effective by the TMT. Specifically, the outside board functional diversity, the learning 
capabilities of the TMT and the frequency of interaction between TMT and outside board are 
taken into account. By complementing this learning approach with the attention based view, 
our research also elucidates which contextual and structural factors are crucial in increasing 
the effectiveness of the outside board’s service tasks. Hence, the second study explains the 
learning components and contingencies under which the outside board service tasks are 
considered effective by the TMT.  
 
1.3.3. Study 3: Outside board human capital and early stage high-tech firm 
performance 
Human capital has been found to be particularly important for new venture performance 
(Unger, Rauch, Frese & Rosenbusch, 2011). However, although frequently founded by teams, 
early stage high-tech firms face significant gaps in their human resource and knowledge base 
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(Han & Benson, 2010). Therefore, building on team production and human capital theory, this 
third study illustrates how the outside board can fill these gaps related to the TMT’s human 
capital profile and subsequently influences early stage high-tech firm performance. Moreover, 
the performance of early stage high-tech firms is a contentious issue. Hence, this paper 
additionally seeks to understand the nature of the relationship between outside board human 
capital and early stage high-tech firm performance. Following Gans and Stern (2003), we 
reveal that early stage high-tech firm performance is heterogeneous and that the appropriate 
performance indicators are contingent on the strategy being pursued by the firm. Accordingly, 
we differentiate between technological and market performance and examine which aspects of 
outside board human capital matter to which aspects of early stage high-tech firm 
performance. 
 
In sum, this doctoral research is embedded in the growing interest in both understanding 
corporate governance and getting richer insights into the functioning of entrepreneurial firms. 
The following chapters present the three studies outlined above. The concluding chapter of 
this dissertation provides a summary of the main findings, and outlines the implications for 
theory and practice. 
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2. TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM AND OUTSIDE BOARD AS 
COMMUNICATING VESSELS IN REACHING OUTSIDE 
BOARD SERVICE INVOLVEMENT: A CONFLICT STUDY 
 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance research has mainly focused on outside board characteristics in 
explaining outside board involvement. However, also the interplay of the outside board 
members with the top management team (TMT) may influence board functioning, given that 
both are considered important organizational decision-making bodies. Building on conflict 
theory, we show how conflict between TMT and outside board unfolds as an important 
antecedent for outside board service involvement. Specifically, we study how TMT – outside 
board task conflict directly impacts the outside board service involvement. Moreover, we 
consider this relation to be mediated by TMT – outside board relationship conflict. Building 
on a hand-collected dataset of 70 early stage high-tech firms in Belgium, we find that TMT – 
outside board task conflict both has direct and indirect, i.e. through TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict, effect on outside board service involvement. We discuss implications for 
academia and practice. 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of good corporate governance in reaching organizational development has 
prompted many researchers to study the functioning of the outside board
5
 (e.g. Johnson, Daily 
& Ellstrand, 1996; Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007). While this stream of literature has been 
dominated by a focus on the monitoring function of the outside board (John & Senbet, 1998; 
Markman, Balkin & Schjoerdt, 2001; Van de Berghe & Baelden, 2005), the relevance of 
outside board service involvement has been given less attention (van den Heuvel, Van Gils & 
Voordeckers, 2006). However, the outside board service tasks, through which outside board 
members provide advice, help building external legitimacy and provide new contacts by 
opening up their personal networks (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), may be equally important. By 
                                                 
5
 We refer to the outside board as the board of directors without insiders, in order to assess the specific added 
value of the outside board members’ involvement. Outside board members are defined following Pearce and 
Zahra (1991): they are (1) no member of the TMT, their associates or families, (2) no employees of the firm or 
its subsidiaries, and (3) no members of the immediate past top management group. 
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performing its service tasks, the outside board may improve the firm’s decision-making 
process (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Stiles & Taylor, 2001) just as 
the relationship with the firm’s environment and its most important stakeholders (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). As such, outside boards are ultimately responsible for corporate success 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). 
Generally, in explaining outside board involvement, prior corporate governance research 
has mainly considered outside board structure, composition and demographics, while 
neglecting the influence of outside board dynamics (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; 
Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2005, 2007; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). Outside boards 
are however expected to be active teams (Letendre, 2004), in which (inter)personal 
relationships rather than outside board demographics represent the greatest influence on 
decision-making (Payne, Benson & Finegold, 1999) and subsequent outside board 
participation (Neill & Dulewicz, 2010). Specifically, the interactions between the outside 
board and the top management team (TMT) may influence the functioning of the outside 
board (Kor, 2006). As such, Pettigrew (1992) argued that research on boards should be 
integrated with studies on the TMT. Although Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) refer to 
outside boards as “supra TMTs”, which stand at the strategic apex of a firm (Mintzberg, 
1973), corporate governance literature has largely overlooked the relationship between both 
parties and has generally depicted and studied TMT and outside board as independent actors. 
Hence, in examining outside board service involvement, i.e. the engagement of the outside 
board in its service tasks, our research explores the interpersonal dynamics between the TMT 
and the outside board as TMTs and outside boards are not standalone entities (Vanaelst, 
Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, Moray & S’Jegers, 2006; Nielsen, 2010). As a result, by 
investigating the relationship between TMTs and outside boards, we contribute to the 
corporate governance literature. Moreover, by focusing on the interaction between TMT and 
outside board, we respond to calls by Huse (2007) and Zona & Zattoni (2007) to further 
investigate the dynamics that lead to outside board service engagement. 
 
Specifically, we examine the impact of conflict between TMT and outside board in 
explaining outside board service involvement. The complex problems outside boards face 
require them to draw on multiple perspectives to reach superior decisions (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). Given that TMT and outside board work together to achieve firm success (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1996), conflicts will be inevitable in this context. A large body of research has 
investigated the impact of conflict on group performance, with a strong theory linking task 
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conflict to improved decision-making (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001) and 
pointing to the negative effects of relationship conflict (Jehn, 1997; Simons & Peterson, 
2000). Task conflict refers to differences of opinion about the content of the task, whereas 
relationship conflict occurs when decision-makers disagree on issues that are personal and 
reflect resentment (Jehn, 1997; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). However, despite this theoretical 
consent, empirical support still remains inconsistent (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; de Wit, 
Greer & Jehn, 2012; O’Neill, Allen & Hastings, 2013). The positive effect of task conflict 
might be undone, revised or mitigated by the negative effects of relationship conflict as both 
types of conflict are interrelated (Amason, 1996; Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Jehn, 1997; 
Smith & Edmondson, 2006). However, the circumstances explaining why the positive effect 
of task conflict changes or how both types of conflict affect group performance is not always 
clear, since the encountered inconsistencies can, amongst others, be attributed to 
methodological issues (Amason & Loughry, 2014). Therefore, we show that task conflict 
intrinsically has a positive impact on group performance, but that this effect may be negated 
by the indirect effect of relationship conflict. Specifically, by using the correct methodology 
and thus investigating the mediating role of relationship conflict, we provide a more fine-
grained insight into the underlying dynamics of the task conflict – outside board service 
involvement relationship.  
In so doing, we investigate an inverted U-shaped effect of task conflict between TMT and 
outside board on outside board service involvement. Although evidence points to the 
existence of an optimal level of task conflict, only a limited number of studies has 
incorporated this curvilinear effect (Jehn, 1995; Amason, 1996; De Dreu, 2006; Tekleab, 
Quigley & Tesluk, 2009), suggesting that, while task conflict is generally beneficial, its merits 
fade away after a certain level. Hence, we also add to the conflict literature by following these 
scholars advocating that the benefits of task conflict are not linear. Finally, while most studies 
have investigated intragroup conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn & Bendersky, 2003), 
our research focusses on conflict between TMT and outside board, which are a firm’s central 
decision-making units (Castro, De La Concha, Gravel & Villegas Periñan, 2009). While 
limited research has addressed conflict between different decision making bodies (Collewaert 
(2012) for instance examined conflicts among entrepreneurs and angel investors), to our 
knowledge, no other empirical work has addressed conflicts between TMT and outside board. 
 
The paper develops as follows. We first present our conceptual framework in which we 
build on conflict theory in explaining the impact of TMT – outside board task conflict on 
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outside board service involvement, followed by a description of our research methodology. 
Subsequently, we present our results and discuss implications for academia and practice. 
 
2.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Given that the TMT and the outside board are a firm’s most important decision-making 
bodies (Daily, McDougall, Covin & Dalton, 2002), they can be considered part of a 
collaboration aimed at realizing the firm’s full potential (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Anderson, Melanson & Maly, 2007; Nielsen, 2010). Consequently, 
given that interactions between both parties are necessary to exchange information, we argue 
that task-related discussions between TMT and outside board are required in order for the 
outside board to get involved in its service-related activities. As such, given that the outside 
board and the TMT may voice different perspectives, task conflict (i.e. content-related 
differences in opinion about the content of the task, Jehn, 1997) may be inevitable (Amason, 
1996). Subsequently, task conflict stimulates both parties to explore new ideas and 
opportunities as it enables them to consider a broader range of viewpoints, options and issues 
(Ensley, Pearson & Amason, 2002). Latimer (1998) for example, argued that TMT members 
can identify more unique approaches to problems when they get exposed to others’ 
standpoints. As such, task conflict can serve as a resource (Miller, Burke & Glick, 1998) for 
both the TMT and the outside board, making it worthwhile to investigate conflict between 
both parties, instead of looking at the impact of conflict within the TMT (e.g. Eisenhardt, 
Kahwajy & Bourgeois, 1997; Lim, Busenitz & Chidambaram, 2012) or the board (e.g. Forbes, 
Korsgaard & Sapienza, 2010; Kerwin, Doherty & Harman, 2011) separately. 
Given that conflict is generally accepted to be multidimensional (Pondy, 1969; Pinkley, 
1990; Jehn, 1994; Amason, 1996), next to task conflict, also relationship conflict, i.e. conflict 
related to personal and emotional disagreement (Jehn, 1997), may be present. Although theory 
indicates task conflict to be beneficial and relationship conflict to be detrimental for group 
performance (Jehn, 1995), empirical studies have remained inconsistent (Amason & Loughry, 
2014). Particularly, the impact of task conflict on group performance may be more complex 
than initially thought, given the importance of the nature of the task being performed (Jehn, 
1995) and its relatedness with relationship conflict (Simons & Peterson, 2000). Therefore, in 
what follows, we start off from investigating the relation between task conflict and group 
performance, and subsequently introduce relationship conflict. As such, we aim at unraveling 
antecedents and consequences in the conflict – group performance relation. 
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2.2.1. TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service involvement 
Task conflict occurs when disagreements exist about the content of the task being 
performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions (Jehn, 1995). Whether task 
conflict is beneficial, depends on the group being investigated and the task being performed 
(Jehn, 1995). In lower level groups, tasks are routine-based and specific procedures and 
formalized policies are in place, as such making task conflict less valuable (Olson, Parayitam 
& Bao, 2007). Yet, in more complex environments, such as executive or directorial teams, 
there are few procedures at hand and uncertainty is likely to occur, which increases the need 
for a problem-solving mindset (Van de Ven, Delbecq & Koenig, 1976). Thus, in decision-
making groups performing non-routine, complicated and multifaceted tasks, task conflict is 
crucial, as it allows the members to more thoroughly consider their options and alternatives in 
reaching high-quality decisions (Schweiger, Sandberg & Ragan, 1986, Jehn, Northcraft & 
Neale, 1999; O’Neill, et al., 2013). In this context, task conflict facilitates information 
exchange (Amason, 1996), hereby fostering the development of new insights and enhancing 
group understanding (Korsgaard, Schweiger & Sapienza, 1995; Amason, 1996). As such, task 
conflict leads to decision-making groups in becoming more engaged (De Dreu & West, 2001), 
consequently increasing their group performance (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Jehn & 
Mannix, 2001). Tjosvold, Dann and Wong (1992) for example, showed that task conflict 
enables marketing teams to use their resources more effectively in order to provide improved 
services to their customers. Likewise, given that both the board and the TMT are a firm’s 
most important decision-making bodies (Daily et al., 2002), we contend that conflict between 
both parties may be crucial in reaching outside board service involvement. The outside board 
sees discussions and constructive task disagreements with the TMT as a means to get 
acquainted with and to fully comprehend firm-specific situations (Johnson, et al., 1996; 
Castanias & Helfat, 2001). Indeed, in order to increase its task understanding, the outside 
board needs to draw from multiple perspectives (Amason & Schweiger, 1994; Pelled, 
Eisenhardt & Xin, 1999) to be able to provide good guidance and advice (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). As such, when content-related disagreements with the TMT take place, the outside 
board can react more focused in executing its service tasks. Bayazit and Mannix (2003) for 
example, show that debate is inherently related to the outside board members’ role of being a 
valuable advisor. Moreover, when open discussions with the TMT are encouraged, the outside 
board not only gets informed, but also becomes more committed (Olson et al., 2007), which 
consequently enables the outside board members to better perform their service tasks (Conger, 
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Lawler & Finegold, 2001). Hence, we argue that outside boards will be better able to give 
advice and to generate external legitimacy when they can constructively discuss content-
related issues with the TMT. Therefore, we expect task conflict between TMT and outside 
board to have a positive effect on outside board service involvement and offer the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: TMT – outside board task conflict is positively related to outside board 
service involvement. 
 
2.2.2. TMT – outside board task conflict, the more the better? 
Despite the expected positive influence of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside 
board service involvement, it is likely that there exists an optimal level of task conflict 
(Boulding, 1963, Jehn, 1995; Miao, Tien, Chang & Ko, 2010) beyond which the participation 
of the outside board in its service tasks decreases. Jehn (1995) shows that too little task 
conflict causes to ignore problems as it will trigger inactivity given that a sense of urgency is 
lacking. Consequently, decision-makers, such as outside boards and TMTs, can insufficiently 
identify and assess the task problems at hand (Van de Vliert & De Dreu, 1994). Likewise, 
when very high levels of task conflict originate, severe and continuous discussions arise, 
resulting in a lack of consensus, which makes it unable to reach effective decision making 
(Gersick, 1989). Indeed, trying to incorporate too many lines of thinking will make the 
outside board and the TMT lose sight as they become unsatisfied with the lack of progress 
(Farh, Lee & Farh, 2010). If task conflict intensifies, players’ cognitive systems shut down, 
which might hinder instead of stimulate information processing, resulting in decreased group 
performance (Carnevale & Probst, 1998). Hence, too much task conflict is costly in time and 
effort as it constraints the integration and evaluation of valuable information (Jehn, 1995, De 
Dreu, 2006). Therefore, we argue that too much task conflict between the TMT and the 
outside board will disable the latter to properly execute its service tasks. We present the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: TMT – outside board task conflict has an inverted U-shaped relation with 
outside board service involvement, such that TMT – outside board task 
conflict first enhances outside board service involvement, but impedes such 
involvement after a certain level. 
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2.2.3. The mediating role of TMT – outside board relationship conflict 
Further, while we expect to find a direct relation between TMT – outside board task 
conflict and outside board service involvement, we posit that this task conflict also indirectly 
influences the engagement of the outside board in its service tasks through relationship 
conflict between the two decision-making units. Particularly, task conflict may lead to 
relationship conflict, or disagreements based on personal differences and disaffection that 
undermine constructive interactions by provoking feelings of resentment (Amason, 1996; 
Buchholtz, Amason & Rutherford, 2005). Indeed, group members might misinterpret 
cognitive opinions as personal criticism (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Jehn, 1997) and as 
such might have the tendency to react personally to cognitive discussions (Mooney, Holahan 
& Amason, 2007). Moreover, members whose ideas get criticized or contradicted, “may feel 
that others in the group do not respect their judgment” (Pelled, et al., 1999, p.7). Therefore, 
although task and relationship conflict are distinct concepts (Ensley, et al., 2002), both types 
of conflict are causally related, such that task conflict may spill over in relationship conflict 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Simons & Peterson, 2000; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). 
Likewise, in a TMT – outside board context, task conflict between both parties can lead to 
TMT – outside board relationship conflict. Although outside board members see discussions 
as part of normal business (Mason & Harrison, 1996), they might have different 
understandings and priorities compared to the TMT. As such, this can give rise to a feeling of 
value dissimilarity (Jehn, 1994), which causes task-oriented conflict to be perceived as 
personal disaffection. 
In turn, relationship conflict may affect group performance. The personal nature of 
relationship conflict causes feelings of anger, animosity and stress (Amason, 1996; Pelled, 
1996) which leads to decreased cohesion (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), judgment (Carnevale 
& Probst, 1998), satisfaction (Jehn, 1994) and commitment (Amason, 1996). Moreover, it 
limits information processing as members spend time focusing on each other instead of 
dealing with task-related problems (Simons & Peterson, 2000), which as such interferes with 
decision quality and group performance (Amason, 1996; De Dreu, 2006). Indeed, if the 
information processing between outside board and TMT is impeded as they concentrate on 
emotional problems compared to task issues, the outside board service involvement might be 
hindered. Hence, we assume that task conflict between TMT and outside board will indirectly, 
i.e. through TMT – outside board relationship conflict, affect outside board service 
involvement. 
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Hypothesis 3: TMT – outside board relationship conflict mediates the relation between 
TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service involvement, 
such that higher levels of TMT – outside board task conflict lead to higher 
levels of TMT – outside board relationship conflict (H3a), in turn negatively 
affecting outside board service involvement (H3b). 
 
Figure 2-1 summarizes our hypotheses. 
 
Figure 2-1 Conceptual model 
 
 
2.3. METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1. Early stage high-tech context 
We study our research questions aimed at unraveling the impact of TMT – outside board 
conflict on outside board service involvement in the context of early stage high-tech firms. 
Specifically, this context is relevant as the execution of the outside board service tasks is of 
great importance in an entrepreneurial environment, as it helps these new ventures to bridge 
the resource dependencies they encounter (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; 
Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003; Garg, 2013). Although new high-tech firms can contribute 
to innovation and regional development (Oakley, 1995), they have difficulties in realizing this 
potential as they are confronted with liabilities of newness and smallness (Henderson, 1999) 
and gaps related to the often homogeneous knowledge base of their TMT (Ensley & 
Hmieleski, 2005; Han and Benson, 2010). Hence, in order to overcome these dependencies, 
the engagement of the outside board in its service tasks is crucial (Zahra, Filatotchev & 
Wright, 2009). Further, the outside board and the TMT are considered a firm’s most important 
decision-making bodies, which definitely holds in an early stage high-tech setting (Daily, et 
TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict 
TMT – outside board 
task conflict 
outside board 
service involvement H1 (+) 
H2 (∩) 
 
H3a (+) H3b (-) 
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al. 2002). Indeed, Zhang, Baden-Fuller and Pool (2011) showed that in this context, outside 
boards and TMTs can be seen as “collective entrepreneurs”. Hence, conflicts may arise within 
this working collective and consequently have an impact on the outside board service 
activities. Finally, task conflict may be particularly relevant in an early stage high-tech 
environment, as it is crucial for new ventures where uncertainty is high and creativity is 
important (Amason, Shrader & Tompson, 2006; Olson, et al., 2007). Indeed, operating in an 
early stage high-tech environment requires constant innovation due to its dynamic and 
competitive nature (George, Zahra, Wheatley & Khan, 2001), which enlarges the need for 
external sources of knowledge (Dees & Hill, 1996). Getting experienced members on the 
outside board is an asset to the new venture (Kroll, Walters & Le, 2007), subsequently 
bringing new perspectives, which may also initiate task conflict (Amason & Sapienza, 1997). 
 
2.3.2. Sample and data collection 
Our study is based upon a hand-collected data set of early stage high-tech firms in Belgium 
constructed during 2011-2014. These ventures operated in high-tech sectors as classified by 
Burgel, Fier and Licht (2004), were founded between 2001 and 2011 as they cannot be older 
than 10 years (Burgel & Murray, 2000), and had no single external shareholder holding a 
majority stake (Burgel, et al., 2004). Using the official public database Bel-First, containing 
general, financial and board-related information on every Belgian company, we identified all 
early stage high-tech firms in Belgium, which resulted in a population of 195 firms. However, 
given our focus on the outside board and the TMT, we needed to eliminate those firms which 
had decision making units that did not conform to the definitions of outside board and TMT. 
First, the early stage high-tech firms needed to have at least one outside board member, 
defined as an individual who is not part of the TMT, its associates or families, not an 
employee of the firm or its subsidiaries, and not a member of the immediate past top 
management group (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Of the 195 firms, 55 did not have an outside 
board, as such reducing our sample to 140 early stage high-tech firms. Second, following 
Amason (1996), a TMT consist of the group of top managers involved in strategic decision 
making as identified by the CEO. 18 early stage high-tech firms did not have a TMT in place, 
as only one person (the CEO) engaged in strategic decision making, as such further 
decreasing our sample to 122 qualifying early stage high-tech firms. Finally, 70 of these 122 
firms (57%) were willing to cooperate in our research. We performed structured face-to-face 
interviews with the firms’ CEO during 2012-2014, and although time-consuming, this 
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personal approach was required to retrieve often confidential and sensitive information, such 
as conflict-related data, which resulted in this high response rate. 
Our study focusses on TMT – outside board dynamics at the group level. Given that we 
use CEOs as key informants, we face the risk that their view of TMT – outside board 
dynamics differed systematically from those of other TMT or outside board members. 
However, this risk is lowered to a great extent since the interviewed CEOs answered specific 
questions related to the recent dynamics of a small group of people, about which they had 
extensive, first-hand knowledge (Chen, Fahr & MacMillan, 1993). Additionally, there is 
empirical evidence that individual respondents do provide reliable and valid responses 
regarding group phenomena (Westphal, 1999; Atuahene-Gima & Murray, 2004). 
Nevertheless, we also collected data from the other TMT and outside board members to assess 
the reliability and validity of the CEO answers. After obtaining their email addresses through 
the CEO, we asked the TMT and outside board members to fill in an online survey and 
received additional information for 29 of the 70 early stage high-tech firms in our sample 
(41%). By using the Paired Samples T Test for those 29 firms, we find that the responses of 
the CEOs did not differ significantly from those of the TMT and outside board members 
(p=.659 and .599 for the task and relationship conflict scale, respectively). As such, the 
answers provided by the CEOs are representative and can be used in our analyses. 
 
2.3.3. Measures 
Dependent variable 
Outside board service involvement. We used Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009)’s 
measure of service involvement and asked the CEOs to indicate to what extent the outside 
board carries out its service tasks. The items were as follows: “To what extent does the 
outside board  (1) contribute on management issues (2) contribute on financial issues, (3) 
contribute on technical issues, (4) contribute on market issues, (5) contribute on legal issues 
and taxation, (6) provide linkage to important external stakeholders, (7) provide the firm with 
external legitimacy and reputation, (8) promote strategic initiatives, (9) get involved in long-
term strategic decision-making and (10) implement long-term strategic decision-making?”. 
Responses were recorded using a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very small extent) 
to 7 (very large extent). The mean value was 4.12 and the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for 
the summated scale was .79. 
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Independent and mediator variables 
TMT – outside board task conflict was computed based on Pearson, Ensley and Amason’s 
(2002) revised version of Jehn’s cognitive conflict scale (1995). The following questions were 
asked: “(1) How often do TMT and outside board members disagree about opinions regarding 
the work being done? (2) How frequently are there conflicts about the ideas outside board and 
TMT members have? (3) How much conflict about the work the outside board does is there 
between outside board and TMT members? (4) To which extent are there differences of 
opinion between outside board and TMT members?”. Responses were recorded using a seven-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (none) to 7 (a lot). Likewise, TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict was measured based upon the revised version of Jehn’s affective conflict 
scale (1995) by Pearson et al. (2002). The following questions were posed: “(1) How much 
friction is there among outside board and TMT members? (2) How much are personality 
conflicts evident between outside board and TMT members? (3) How much tension is there 
among outside board and TMT members? (4) How much emotional conflict is there among 
outside board and TMT members?”. Again, responses were recorded using a seven-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (none) to 7 (a lot). The mean value for TMT – outside board task 
conflict was 3.05 and 2.78 for TMT – outside board relationship conflict. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha coefficients were .88 and .90 for the summated task and relationship conflict scales 
respectively, indicating excellent reliability. 
In order to test the distinctiveness of our conflict scales, we  performed a confirmatory 
factor analysis. We compared a two-factor model where the two latent variables were allowed 
to correlate, with a one-factor model where all eight items loaded on one latent variable. The 
results showed that the two-factor model (comparative fit index (CFI) = .98; root mean square 
of approximation (RMSEA) = .10 (confidence interval (CI): .027-.156); standardized root 
mean residual (SRMR) = .05) fits the data better than the one-factor model (CFI = .929; 
RMSEA = .18 (CI: .136-.233); SRMR = .075). This indicated that task and relationship 
conflict can be discriminated by respondents. 
 
Control variables 
In addition to our hypothesized predictors, several other aspects may influence outside 
board service involvement. Therefore, we control for firm age, firm industry, frequency of 
board meetings, CEO duality, venture capital ownership and outsider/insider ratio. 
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We control for firm age by taking the natural log of the number of years the new venture 
exists, to ensure that none of the identified effects are the result of age-related processes. The 
sampled early stage high-tech firms are on average 6.90 years old. 
Firm industry is controlled for by introducing two dummies: ICT industry and health and 
life sciences industry. These variables equal 1 if the firm belongs to this industry category, 
and 0 otherwise. The rationale for controlling for the technological domain lies in institutional 
theory, which suggests that organizational practices may be related to industry-specific norms 
(Eisenhardt, 1988). Fifty two percent of the firms in our sample belong to the ICT industry 
and twenty percent operate in the health and life sciences industry. The category “other 
industry” is used as the reference category. 
Frequency of board meetings is measured as the number of board meetings organized on a 
yearly basis (Vafeas, 1999). The more frequently board meetings are held, the better informed 
outside board members are about the firm, necessary for providing tailored support. The firms 
in our sample on average hold 6.53 meetings a year. 
CEO duality equals 1 if the CEO of the company is also the board chair, 0 otherwise. We 
control for CEO duality because the creation of a centralized representative can enhance 
clarity, particularly in a dynamic high-tech environment (Gabrielsson, 2007). Forty one 
percent of the firms in our sample reported CEO duality.  
Venture capital ownership is a dummy variable (0/1) indicating whether the firm has raised 
venture capital (VC) or not. Forty four percent of the firms in our sample are VC-backed, 
which is high but not surprising, as this type of financing is often seen as one of the most 
appropriate ways of funding early stage high-tech firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). We 
control for VC financing as outside boards in VC-backed firms may be more actively 
involved in strategic decision making, which is one of the service tasks (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2002). 
Outsider/insider ratio is the proportion of outsiders to insiders in the board room. The 
motivation to control for this variable is that boards with higher proportions of outsiders may 
have more weight attributed to the outsiders in board decision making (Haynes & Hillman, 
2010). The boards in our sample on average have almost three times as many outsiders as 
insiders. 
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2.4. RESULTS 
Given our focus on the interaction between outside board and TMT, we only incorporated 
those early stage high-tech ventures with at least one outside board and TMT member, which 
might give rise to potential selectivity biases. Consequently, we use Heckman’s selection 
procedure to assure that our results are not affected by any self-selection effect (Heckman, 
1979). Essentially, this selectivity model entails a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, or 
the selection equation (presented in Table 2-1), a probit regression is used to determine 
whether the early stage high-tech firm has an outside board and TMT, or not. We define this 
dummy variable to be a function of the venture’s age, independence, industry, VC ownership 
and firm size (in terms of full time equivalents), which is largely in line with other selection 
models applied in board research (e.g. Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013). Based upon the results 
of this first-stage model, we predicted and saved the value for the inverse Mill’s ratio (λi), 
which is the monotone decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected 
into our sample. In the second stage or regression equation, which estimates the outside board 
service involvement model, the inverse Mill’s ratio enters as an explanatory variable. This 
two-stage procedure generates consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates (Heckman, 
1979).  
 
Table 2-1 Selection equation 
Selection equation (step 1) 
Outside board and TMT 0/1 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Firm age (ln) .49 
Firm independence -.25 
ICT industry -.44
+
 
VC ownership .71* 
Firm size: number of full time equivalents .04** 
Constant -.08 
Significance levels: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
The selection step is presented in Table 2-1 and indicates that larger firms, as well as VC-
backed firms are more likely to have both an outside board and TMT. These outcomes are not 
surprising, as larger firms need more structure and firm size is strongly associated with both 
TMT (Beckman, Burton & O’Reilly, 2007) and outside board (Zald, 1969) size. Moreover, 
venture capitalists typically require the establishment of an outside board and get a seat on the 
board following their investment (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2001; Gompers & Lerner, 2001). 
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Table 2-2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used, for 
those firms which have an outside board and a TMT. 
 
Table 2-2 Means, standard deviations and correlations 
Variables mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Firm age (ln) 1.83 0.48           
2. ICT industry a 0.52 0.50 -.04          
3. Health and life 
sciences industry 
a
 
0.20 0.41 -.17 -.53         
4. Frequency of board 
meetings 
6.53 3.36 -.04 .03 -.01        
5. CEO duality a 0.41 0.49 .06 .19 -.20 -.01       
6. VC ownership a 0.44 0.50 -.09 -.14 .41 -.05 -.25      
7. Outsider/insider ratio 2.98 2.10 -.02 -.21 .37 .01 -.28 .39     
8. Mills ratio 0.59 0.38 -.14 .41 -.44 .03 .25 -.71 -.39    
9. TMT – outside board 
task conflict 
3.05 1.32 .00 .08 -.13 -.06 .13 -.16 -.10 .22   
10. TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict 
2.78 1.42 -.04 .03 .03 -.08 .13 -.15 -.06 .19 .71  
11. Outside board 
service involvement 
4.02 1.10 -.07 -.27 .13 .34 -.02 -.13 .04 .01 .27 .01 
Pearson correlation coefficients (1-tailed), indicating significant correlations (p<.05) in bold. 
a
 Correlations of binary variables should be interpreted with care. 
 
Next, our main hypotheses were tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis (step 2). Variance inflation factors ranged between 1.055 and 2.161, indicating that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue in our study (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & 
Tahal, 2006). Additionally, we analyzed the nonlinear effect of TMT – outside board task 
conflict on outside board service involvement and its mediating effect through TMT – outside 
board relationship conflict using the MEDCURVE macro for SPSS (Hayes & Preacher, 
2010). This method provides bootstrap estimates with bias-corrected confidential intervals of 
the indirect effect. We particularly rely on this method as it allows us to specify the functional 
paths in the model and at the same time, it permits us to compose a mediation model. As such, 
we set the relation between TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service 
involvement as quadratic and indicate TMT – outside board relationship conflict as being the 
mediation variable. 
 
Figure 2-2 illustrates our conceptual model in path diagram. The first model, in Panel A, is 
used to test whether TMT – outside board task conflict has an effect on outside board service 
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involvement (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Of interest in this model is an estimate and test of the 
significance of path c. The second and third model, in Panel B, are pertinent to the estimation 
of the indirect effect of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside board service 
involvement through TMT – outside board relationship conflict (Hypothesis 3), derived from 
paths a and b. 
 
Figure 2-2 Conceptual model represented in the form of a path model, referring to 
the OLS regression coefficients estimated and reported in Table 2-3 
 
 
 
 
The results of these main analyses are presented in Table 2-3. First, the control model 
contains control variables only. We find that the ICT industry dummy variable has a 
significant negative impact on outside board service involvement (B=-.660, p<.05). 
Moreover, early stage high-tech firms holding board meetings more frequently experience 
higher levels of outside board service involvement (B=.110, p<.01). Second, Model 1 reports 
the total effect (c in Panel A of Figure 2-2) and estimates whether TMT – outside board task 
conflict has a positive effect on outside board service involvement. We find a significant 
positive relation between TMT – outside board task conflict and outside board service 
involvement (B=.295, p<.01), but no total quadratic effect, as the squared coefficient for task 
conflict points into the expected direction, but is statistically insignificant. As such, we find 
TMT – outside board 
task conflict 
outside board 
service involvement 
c 
∩ 
Model 1 
TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict 
TMT – outside board 
task conflict 
outside board 
service involvement 
a b 
∩ 
c' 
Model 2 
Model 3 
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support for Hypothesis 1, but no support for Hypothesis 2. Finally, Model 2 and 3 
decompose Model 1, allowing to estimate the presence and level of the direct (c’ in Panel B of 
Figure 2-2) and indirect (a and b in Panel B of Figure 2-2) effect. We find a direct effect of 
TMT – outside board task conflict on outside board service involvement (B=.755, p<.05) and 
this path is significantly mediated by the indirect effect of TMT – outside board relationship 
conflict (based on path a (B=.756, p<.001) and path b (B=-.265, p<.05), the indirect effect is 
significantly negative; 95% CI [-.430; -.054]). Hence, our results provide support for 
Hypothesis 3, just as our sub-hypotheses H3a and H3b. 
 
Table 2-3 OLS regression model with MEDCURVE (standard errors in parentheses) 
 Control model 
Outside board 
service 
involvement 
Model 1 
Outside board 
service 
involvement 
Model 2 
TMT – outside 
board relationship 
conflict 
Model 3 
Outside board 
service 
involvement 
Constant 3.909*** 
(.766) 
2.923** 
(.869) 
.263 
(.952) 
2.586* 
(.988) 
Predictors     
TMT – outside board 
task conflict 
 .295** 
(.097) 
.756*** 
(.099) 
.755* 
(.380) 
TMT – outside board 
task conflict squared 
 -.058 
(.056) 
 -.044 
(.055) 
TMT – outside board 
relationship conflict 
   -.265* 
(.114) 
Controls     
Firm age (ln) -.143 
(.252) 
-.126 
(.266) 
.029 
(.291) 
-.114 
(.256) 
ICT industry -.660* 
(.280) 
-.574 
(.301) 
.162 
(.329) 
-.533 
(.291) 
Health & life 
sciences industry 
.078 
(.364) 
-.029 
(.398) 
.751 
(.436) 
.167 
(.394) 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
.110** 
(.032) 
.142*** 
(.035) 
-.023 
(.039) 
.136*** 
(.034) 
CEO duality .093 
(.237) 
.116 
(.269) 
.094 
(.294) 
.136 
(.260) 
VC ownership -.390 
(.337) 
-.293 
(.339) 
-.185 
(.370) 
-.334 
(.328) 
Outsider/insider ratio .031 
(.060) 
.036 
(.069) 
-.003 
(.075) 
.033 
(.066) 
Mills ratio .028 
(.467) 
-.287 
(.493) 
.239 
(.540) 
-.221 
(.477) 
Adjusted R² .145 .243 .456 .296 
F-statistic 2.845** 3.220** 7.672*** 3.633*** 
Significance levels:*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; N=70 
 
c’ 
b 
a 
c 
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2.5. DISCUSSION 
This paper has sought to contribute to our understanding of how board interpersonal 
dynamics, and particularly task conflict between TMT and outside board, affect outside board 
service involvement. Research adopting a conflict perspective has typically investigated 
conflict in an intragroup context, while this study explored the interactions between outside 
board and TMT, given that both parties are a firm’s most important decision-making units 
(Pettigrew, 1992). Moreover, previous studies have found strong linkages between task and 
relationship conflict, but the findings related to the impact of both types of conflict on group 
performance remain inconsistent (Amason, 1996; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Ensley et al., 2002). 
As Forbes, et al. (2010) indicate, more insight is needed into the impact of task conflict “to 
clarify how and why its process unfolds as it does” (p. 579). Hence, this paper aimed at 
providing a clear understanding of the task conflict – group performance relation, by 
disentangling its direct and indirect effects in a board service context. 
Our analyses show that TMT – outside board task conflict has a positive total effect on 
outside board service involvement. Moreover, we identify TMT – outside board relationship 
conflict to be an important mediator in this relation. Specifically, there is a positive direct 
effect of TMT – outside board task conflict on outside board service involvement, while its 
indirect effect, i.e. through TMT – outside board relationship conflict, has negative 
implications for the engagement of the outside board in its service tasks. Consequently, 
although previous empirical evidence has been inconsistent, we find that task conflict indeed 
produces the desired positive effects for group performance, but that the unintentionally 
triggered relationship conflict weakens this result. Therefore, it is crucial to apply the right 
methodology in order to correctly analyze the obtained results. Moreover, these outcomes 
learn us that the outside board should attempt to minimize the deteriorating effect of 
relationship conflict. Decision-making groups must realize that they come together to share 
diverse perspectives and thus should not let personal issues or emotions interfere (O’Neill, et 
al., 2013). Additionally, we did not detect an optimal level of TMT – outside board task 
conflict in explaining outside board service involvement, which can be due to our sample of 
early stage high-tech firms, which may still be too young for severe conflicts to have 
occurred. Alternatively, these ventures may be so resource-dependent that any intervention by 
the outside board is deemed to contribute, irrespective of the level of task conflict it generates.  
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2.5.1. Implications for theory 
Our research makes a number of contributions to the corporate governance, 
entrepreneurship and conflict literatures. First, corporate governance and entrepreneurship 
literatures have primarily focused on the control tasks of the outside board (e.g. Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990, Markman et al., 2001). Yet, outside board service involvement is equally 
important, especially in early stage (high-tech) ventures, where advice and network access are 
crucial (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2007) given the encountered liabilities of newness 
and smallness (Henderson, 1999) and the demanding and rapidly changing environment they 
are operating in (Zahra & George, 2002). As such, our study contributes by unfolding 
(particularly conflict-related) dynamics which affect outside board service involvement. 
Moreover, our study contributes by integrating the TMT, often studied in entrepreneurship 
studies, and the outside board, often addressed in the corporate governance literature. Indeed, 
while Pettigrew (1992) indicated that research on board functioning should be incorporated 
with studies on the TMT, given that these can be considered a collective working together to 
reach a firm’s full potential, recent research even observes a dividing line between both 
streams (Nielsen, 2010). As such, we respond to several calls to study outside boards and 
TMTs together instead of considering them as standalone entities (Carpenter, Pollock & 
Leary, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Nielsen, 2010). Finally, we show that it is worthwhile 
to investigate the interpersonal relationships between TMT and outside board, rather than 
merely looking at their demographics. Hence, we follow Zona and Zattoni (2007) showing 
that corporate governance research needs to go beyond “the black box of demographics” in 
studying outside board service involvement. Second, our paper enriches the conflict literature 
by gaining a better insight into the complex relation between conflict and group performance. 
Our study demonstrated that task and relationship conflict are two distinct constructs 
(Pearson, et al., 2002), which allowed us to further investigate the interplay between both. 
While we do find that the overall effect of task conflict is positive for group performance, the 
levels of relationship conflict, which are induced by higher levels of task conflict, are not to 
be ignored given their negative influence on group performance. As such, the fact that most 
research has explored direct and standalone effects of different types of conflict on group 
performance may explain the inconsistency of reported findings. Moreover, while task and 
relationship conflict have mainly been studied in an intragroup context (De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003), our study shows that it is beneficial to investigate conflict in an intergroup context, in 
which conflict between organizational decision-making units is considered. 
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2.5.2. Implications for practice 
Our study has implications for practitioners, such as (high-tech) entrepreneurs, outside 
board members and their stakeholders. Given the importance of task conflict in reaching 
superior decision-making, discussions in the boardroom should be stimulated in order to share 
different perspectives. At the same time, participants in such discussions should be cautious in 
order to avoid task conflict from spilling over into relationship conflict. For example, 
relationship conflict can be minimized through “harmonious personal relationships”(Neill & 
Dulewicz, 2010). It is further most likely that also the board chair, as an important actor in 
creating engaged boards (Leblanc, 2005), has an important role to play in making sure that 
discussions in the board room are not perceived as personal critique towards specific board 
members. 
 
2.5.3. Limitations and directions for future research 
While our research has both theoretical and practical implications, it also has limitations 
which may lead to future research directions. First, our research design was cross-sectional. 
While in line with the majority of conflict studies, further research could adopt a longitudinal 
design to explore how different types of conflict develop over time and to distinguish between 
short-term and long-term consequences of conflict for outside board service involvement. 
Second, our findings built on a sample of firms established in one country, namely Belgium. 
While exclusively focusing on Belgium had the advantage of gaining access to the CEO 
through face-to-face interviews just as the achievement of high response rates, it has the 
disadvantage that the results could be more difficult to generalize to other regions. Future 
studies could therefore analyze the extent to which our results hold in different contexts, 
where other regulations related to board composition and functioning may apply. Third, while 
TMT – outside board interactions are especially important in an early stage high-tech setting, 
it could be interesting to study whether our results withstand in larger and more established 
organizational settings, in which firms may be less dependent on the service involvement of 
the outside board. Finally, while our results indicated that outside board service involvement 
declines when task conflict spills over into relationship conflict, follow-up studies could 
investigate which mechanisms or procedures (e.g. board chair characteristics, interaction and 
communication patterns) could mitigate or avoid this effect from taking place. Most 
interestingly, researcher could make use of qualitative research designs, such as action 
research or participant observations, in studying these contingencies. 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we jointly studied TMTs and outside boards by unraveling their interpersonal 
dynamics. Our findings demonstrate, by using the appropriate methodology, that TMT – 
outside board task conflict both directly and indirectly affects outside board service 
involvement.  
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3. A LEARNING AND ATTENTION BASED VIEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON OUTSIDE BOARD SERVICE 
EFFECTIVENESS IN EARLY STAGE HIGH-TECH FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Early stage high-tech ventures face a number of challenges, related to the resource 
dependencies they face. In this context, the importance of the outside board service tasks is 
likely to be enhanced, given that outside board members may assist the top management team 
(TMT) in gaining access to new knowledge and complementary capabilities. However, the 
degree to which the outside board knowledge helps to bridge deficiencies within the TMT 
will depend on how this external knowledge is internalized. As such, by taking a learning 
perspective, we examine the conditions under which service-related interventions by the 
outside board are considered effective by the TMT. Drawing on a hand-collected dataset of 89 
early stage high-tech firms in Belgium, we find that TMT absorptive capacity and frequency 
of interaction between TMT and outside board are important antecedents of outside board 
service effectiveness. Further, by complementing the learning perspective with the attention 
based view, we show that both structural and contextual factors, such as CEO duality and firm 
underperformance, are important elements in increasing the effectiveness of the outside 
board’s service tasks. We discuss implications for academia and practice. 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Although high-tech firms have the potential to contribute significantly to individual wealth 
and regional prosperity (Venkataraman, 2004), they experience difficulties in realizing this 
potential in the early days due to liabilities of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Outside boards
6
 may be particularly important in an early stage (high-tech) environment 
(Zahra, Filatotchev & Wright, 2009; Chancharat, Krishnamurti & Tian, 2012) as they help 
these new ventures to bridge the challenges and dependencies they are faced with. Unlike 
their counterparts in large, established firms, outside boards in these new ventures may be 
                                                 
6
 We refer to the outside board as the board of directors without insiders in order to assess the specific added 
value of the outside board members in relation to the TMT. Outside board members are defined following Pearce 
and Zahra (1991): they are (1) not members of the TMT, their associates or families, (2) not employees of the 
firm or its subsidiaries, and (3) not members of the immediate past top management group. 
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more likely to engage in their service tasks rather than performing a control function (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Garg, 2013; Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013). 
Specifically, entrepreneurial top management teams (TMTs) in high-tech firms are often 
homogeneous in terms of knowledge, education and experience (Franklin, Wright & Locket, 
2001; Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005) as they are largely technical in nature and lack important 
commercial skills and networks (Lockett, Siegel, Wright & Ensley, 2005). Moreover, 
operating in a high-tech industry requires constant innovation due to its dynamic and 
competitive nature (George, Zahra, Wheatley & Khan, 2001), which requires a regular source 
of external knowledge (Dees & Hill, 1996). Hence, while significant human resource gaps 
within these TMTs are common (Han & Benson, 2010), external human capital might address 
these dependencies (Zahra, 1996). Therefore, outside boards are important in helping TMTs 
gain access to new knowledge, resources and complementary capabilities (Shenkar & Li, 
1999; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004), through the engagement in their service tasks (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). 
Outside board members can provide advice and strengthen external legitimacy and 
networking, which are considered amongst the most valuable outside board service tasks 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). As such, the outside board can help the TMT to improve decision-
making processes (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) and to increase the quality of strategic 
decision-making (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Simultaneously, outside board members assist in 
building the firm’s external legitimacy and reputation by opening up their personal networks 
(Pfeffer, 1972) which will improve the firm’s relationship with the environment and its most 
important stakeholders (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Nielsen (2010) accordingly argues that TMTs 
and outside boards are not standalone entities, whereas Zhang, Baden-Fuller and Pool (2011) 
explicate this complementarity by calling outside boards and TMTs “collective entrepreneurs” 
in entrepreneurial threshold firms.  
 
Despite the importance of the outside board service involvement in an early stage high-
tech context, both the entrepreneurship and corporate governance literatures have only 
sparsely studied its antecedents and effectiveness. Hence, this paper seeks to make a number 
of contributions to both corporate governance and entrepreneurship literatures. First, 
governance studies have traditionally explored how board structure and composition impact 
board functioning (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). However, studying these “usual 
suspects” does not provide understanding of how outside boards can contribute to 
organizational value creation (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2007). Therefore, recent 
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studies call to move beyond board demographics to examine what drives outside board 
involvement (Wan & Ong, 2005; Huse, 2007; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Moreover, the primary 
focus of corporate governance research has been on the monitoring aspect of the outside 
board (e.g. John & Senbet, 1998; Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005). We try to give a better 
insight into the outside board service tasks as these remain fairly understudied (van den 
Heuvel, Van Gils & Voordeckers, 2006), while at least equally important, especially in an 
early stage (high-tech) environment (Garg, 2013). Furthermore, we do not merely record what 
outside boards do, but focus on the effectiveness of their service interventions for the TMT, 
hereby responding to several research calls to include firm behavioral and context specific 
characteristics in studying the outside board’s engagement in the service tasks (Pye & 
Pettigrew, 2005; Huse, 2007; Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). As such, we investigate 
when outside board involvement is considered valuable by the TMT. Second, the 
entrepreneurship literature has thoroughly studied the TMT, while the outside board has only 
recently been recognized as an important decision-making party (Machold, Huse, Minichilli 
& Nordqvist, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011). Therefore, by exploring when and how outside boards 
contribute to the TMT, this paper adds to the literature by recognizing the outside board as an 
important complement to the TMT. Moreover, the few studies that did focus on the outside 
board in this context have largely taken a board capital perspective, arguing that experienced 
outside board members are an asset to the new venture (Kroll, Walters & Le, 2007; Bjornali 
& Gulbrandsen, 2010). While we agree on the potential value of outside board capital, we 
argue that adding sufficiently high levels of outside board human capital may be a necessary 
but insufficient condition for outside board service effectiveness. Specifically, we add to the 
board capital literature by taking a learning perspective and reason that, next to outside board 
human capital, the outside board service effectiveness will be contingent on the learning 
capabilities of the TMT and the frequency of interaction between both parties. Additionally, 
this learning perspective is complemented by the attention based view (Ocasio, 1997), 
suggesting that more complementary knowledge brought by the outside board will 
particularly lead to higher levels of outside board service effectiveness when structural and 
contextual factors motivate the outside board to draw their attention towards specific service 
tasks. As such, our contribution is to identify the contingencies under which outside board 
capital is more or less valuable whilst demonstrating how the attention based view can be a 
useful complement to learning theory. 
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In what follows, we first build our theoretical framework drawing from learning theory and 
the attention based view. Next, we elaborate on our research methodology. We subsequently 
present our analysis and results, and reflect on our findings, including implications for 
academia and practice. 
 
3.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The process where knowledge is created, distributed, communicated and integrated into the 
organization is called organizational learning (Duncan & Weiss, 1978). Yet, in order for 
organizations to solve highly complex problems, team learning is also essential (Katzenbach 
& Smith, 1993; Marsick, Dechant & Kasl, 1993). Indeed, the organizational learning literature 
has shown that teams are vital in acquiring, sharing and refining task-relevant knowledge 
(Argote, 1999; Edmondson, 2002) and Senge (1990: 10) even argues that “unless teams can 
learn, the organization cannot learn”. Team learning is defined as “a relatively permanent 
change in the team’s collective level of knowledge and skills produced by the shared 
experience of the team members” (Ellis, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Porter, West & Moon, 2003, 
p.822). Following a team learning perspective fits our purpose as TMTs in an early stage 
high-tech environment can reconfigure the nature of their capabilities through accessing, 
developing and integrating new and existing knowledge (Lockett et al., 2005), which can in 
turn create and preserve a sustainable competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996; 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Entrepreneurial TMTs can acquire new knowledge and 
complementary capabilities through the outside board (Shenkar & Li, 1999; Zahra & 
Filatotchev, 2004). In such a learning context, the TMT can be considered the student whereas 
the outside board is the teacher (Audretsch & Stephan, 1996). Subsequently, we explain the 
conditions under which the student is able to effectively learn from its teacher. 
The organizational, individual and team learning literature consistently identify three main 
learning components (Grant, 1996; Kessler, Bierly & Gopalakrishnan, 2000). A first 
component is the teacher’s new and diverse knowledge, which relates, in our board 
perspective, to the novelty and diversity of the knowledge brought by the outside board. The 
second learning component involves the student’s absorptive capacity, which is its ability to 
absorb new knowledge provided by the teacher. Therefore, in a board learning context, we 
identify TMT absorptive capacity as the second important learning element. The third and 
final learning component refers to the intensity of interaction between teacher and student. 
Since continuous and frequent interactions are a precondition for successful learning and 
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collaboration (Kirat & Lung, 1999), we consider the frequency of board meetings as a final 
component in a board learning context. 
Nevertheless, in order for the teacher to share new knowledge, the outside board members 
need extrinsic and intrinsic knowledge sharing motivation (Lin, 2007). Therefore, we 
complement learning theory with the attention based view (ABV) in order to study which 
internal (i.e. structural) and external (i.e. situational) factors draw the outside board’s attention 
towards engagement in those service activities that matter most to the firm. Specifically, and 
in line with the ABV literature, we identify CEO duality and firm underperformance as 
important elements influencing structural distribution of attention and situated attention of the 
outside board, respectively. 
Building on learning theory and the attention based view, we develop our conceptual 
framework in explaining outside board service effectiveness, defined as the effectiveness of 
the outside board’s interventions through its service tasks. In so doing, we get new insights 
into when the outside board service involvement is found effective by the TMT, as such 
explaining the conditions under which the latter is able to effectively learn from the outside 
board. Our theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1 Theoretical framework 
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3.2.1. Learning component 1: Teacher perspective 
A first learning component involves the novel and diverse knowledge brought by the 
teacher (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The teacher ensures new 
knowledge and external relationships, allowing the student to gain important complementary 
sources of knowledge (Harrigan, 1985; Dees & Hill, 1996). Consequently, in the board 
learning context, this first learning component relates to outside board human capital, which 
has been shown to be important for the outside board’s ability to advise the TMT (Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz & Johnson, 2008; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). In an early stage high-
tech context, the TMT often has high levels of technical experience (Ensley & Hmieleski, 
2005), but lacks other types of human capital. Given the need to access knowledge and skills 
in multiple fields following the dynamic characteristics of the early stage high-tech 
environment (George, et al., 2001), the outside board is particularly likely to contribute when 
it brings diverse human capital. Indeed, Wuyts, Colombo and Dutta (2005) point to diversity 
as a crucial condition for learning and innovation, which is associated with agents with 
different knowledge or skills. Ideally, the outside board adds business experts with knowledge 
on corporate issues, support specialists with expertise in financial affairs and community 
influentials with experience and relationships with external stakeholders (Hillman, Cannella 
& Paetzold, 2000). An outside board with such functional diversity is better able to give 
advice to the TMT (Westphal, 1999) as it can provide a larger variety of knowledge (Kroll, et 
al., 2007), and can enhance the TMT’s networking ties (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002) just as 
firm legitimacy (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 2001). Furthermore, outside board functional 
diversity will lead to different types of perspectives and a greater ability to solve problems 
(Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002), increased quality of decision-making in the board (Doz & 
Kosonen, 2008) and consequently better (outside board) performance (Johnson, Schnatterly & 
Hill, 2013). As such, more diverse outside boards are likely to bring knowledge where TMTs 
can learn from, and which may possibly lead to overlaps in the interpretation systems between 
TMT and outside board, hereby enabling the latter to understand the issues relevant for the 
TMT. Subsequently, we argue that the TMT will value the outside board interventions 
through the service tasks more pronouncedly when the outside board has a high level of 
functional diversity, and offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between outside board functional diversity 
and outside board service effectiveness. 
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3.2.2. Role of situated and structural attention 
Although the board capital literature has proposed that new and diverse knowledge brought 
by the outside board may be beneficial to the effectiveness of the outside board’s 
interventions, outside board members are, as all decision-makers, limited in their information 
procession capacities (Cyert & March, 1963), which requires them to selectively attend to 
certain issues and answers, while neglecting others (Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, as we argue 
below, the diverse human capital the outside board brings, will be particularly beneficial 
through its service involvement, if structural or contextual factors motivate outside board 
members to focus their attention towards their service tasks. 
 
First, an important principle of the ABV is structural distribution of attention, or the idea 
that structural factors, such as the firm’s rules, resources, and social relationships regulate and 
control the focus of actors’ attention (Ocasio, 1997). As such, formal firm structures will 
affect the board’s allocation of attention towards the service tasks or particular service 
components. One of the most important structural elements of the outside board is CEO 
duality (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009). CEO duality occurs when a firm’s CEO 
also holds the board chair position of the firm (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Although agency 
theory advocates the potential drawbacks originating from this dual position, CEO duality 
may be particularly beneficial in an early stage high-tech environment. Indeed, 
entrepreneurial firms are less likely to encounter agency problems (Garg, 2013) and therefore 
conflicts of interest between CEO and outside board are not a main concern (Krause, 
Semadeni & Cannella, 2014). Instead, CEO duality provides a unity of command necessary to 
manage the environmental uncertainty, which asks for speedy decision-making (Boyd, 1995). 
Moreover, it increases the firm’s legitimacy by sending a signal to stakeholders that the 
company has a clear sense of direction (Salancik & Meindl, 1984). Since the CEO-chair is 
expected to have a better insight into what is readily available within the TMT, (s)he also 
recognizes which knowledge is lacking and what the diverse outside board can add in order 
for the TMT to learn and make progress. With the chair also being part of the TMT, the 
outside board is more rapidly acquainted with the TMT’s necessities and knowledge 
requirements as the CEO-chair may communicate these issues to the outside board, hereby 
resolving decision-making uncertainties (Machold et al., 2011). In turn, the outside board is 
more likely to get involved and to direct its attention towards the engagement in its service 
tasks given that they are kept informed by the CEO-chair (Mallette & Fowler, 1992; 
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Knockaert, Bjornali & Erikson, 2014). Similarly, first-hand information can help the outside 
board to direct its attention towards those service elements which are particularly relevant to 
the TMT. Hence, we argue that bringing functional diversity in the outside board will be 
beneficial to the TMT through the generation of higher levels of outside board service 
effectiveness, and that this relationship will be strengthened by CEO duality which may help 
to direct the outside board’s attention towards those service activities which are relevant to the 
TMT. We present the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: CEO duality will positively moderate the relationship between outside board 
functional diversity and outside board service effectiveness. 
 
Second, the principle of situated attention in the ABV indicates that what issues and 
answers decision-makers focus on, and what they do, depends on the particular context or 
situation they find themselves in (Ocasio, 1997). Following this principle, contextual elements 
might affect the extent to which outside boards put their board capital to work for the benefit 
of the focal firm. One such contextual factor is firm underperformance (see Tuggle, Sirmon, 
Reutzel & Bierman, 2010). Firm underperformance is a way of assessing managerial 
effectiveness (Walsh & Seward, 1990) and occurs when the current firm performance is 
below a certain aspiration level, as perceived by the decision-makers (Audia & Greve, 2006).  
Consequently, firm underperformance may trigger problemistic search by the outside board, 
as problems are only recognized to the extent that firms fail to satisfy their objective(s) (Cyert 
& March, 1963). This negative performance deviation might trigger the decision-makers’ 
behavior to adjust their actions accordingly and the outside board will aim at finding solutions 
to immediate problems of accountability (Cyert & March, 1963; Milliken & Lant, 1991). As 
such, instead of trying to deal with every threat or opportunity, the satisficing nature of 
outside board decision-making is considered a guiding principle (Baumol, 2004; Hendry, 
2005). Likewise, venture capitalists, which typically have a seat on the outside board, 
encounter significant time-constraints and thus concentrate their efforts on the 
underperforming firms in their portfolio (Fredriksen, Olofsson & Wahlbin, 1997) in order to 
regenerate the weak portfolio companies (MacMillan, Kulow & Khoylian, 1988). 
Additionally, firm underperformance might implicate that the outside board’s reputation is at 
stake (Fama, 1980) and consequently outside board members will most likely feel responsible 
and direct their attention towards firm-relevant service tasks. Hence, firm underperformance 
can motivate outside board members to become more engaged (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
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Audia & Greve, 2006; Tuggle, et al., 2010). It follows that the impact of outside board 
functional diversity on outside board service effectiveness will be intensified when the firm 
performs below its expectations, due to heightened attention by the outside board to their 
service involvement. Consequently, we offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firm underperformance will positively moderate the relationship between 
outside board functional diversity and outside board service effectiveness. 
 
3.2.3. Learning component 2: Student perspective 
The second learning component relates to the absorptive capacity of the student. 
Absorptive capacity is the general ability to value, assimilate and commercialize new and 
external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Indeed, people see the world according to 
their cognition which has developed in different conditions, such as organizational culture, 
social norms and values (Wuyts, et al., 2005). In order for the student to learn from the 
teacher, a “shared interpretation system” (Weick, 1995) is needed, in which they share basic 
perceptions and values to be able to align competences and motives. In order for students to 
successfully understand, interpret and realize the benefits of external information, a nominal 
level of expertise in that particular area is essential (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), which is 
mainly a function of its prior related knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  
Applying this concept of student absorptive capacity to a board learning context, we argue 
that TMT (i.e. the student) absorptive capacity will help the TMT to learn from, absorb and 
deploy external knowledge brought to it by the outside board (i.e. the teacher). Higher levels 
of team absorptive capacity have been shown to result in a better integration of new 
knowledge (Griffith & Sawyer, 2010). Moreover, the existence of external knowledge as such 
provides no benefits to the TMT if it cannot identify and deploy this knowledge (West & 
Gallagher, 2006). Therefore, as learning can only take place when a shared interpretation 
system is established, the TMT needs absorptive capacity in order to effectively learn from 
the (new) external knowledge offered by the outside board. 
In an early stage high-tech firm, TMT members often originate from a research context 
(Franklin, Wright & Lockett, 2001). At the same time, outside board members are typically 
active in a business environment (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), where other types of 
conditions and cultures apply. Furthermore, it is well acknowledged that inherent tensions 
exist between research and commercial environments (Hackett, 2001). Consequently, we 
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argue that, in order for TMTs to learn from the new knowledge brought to them by the outside 
board, they will need some industry experience (Tyler & Steensma, 1998) in order to 
understand the corporate environment outside board members typically come from. The more 
the TMT shares basic perceptions to align its competences and motives with the outside 
board, the better it is capable of absorbing the advice provided by the outside board (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). Given that TMTs with industry experience can determine opportunities for 
innovation (Weterings & Koster, 2007), trigger entrepreneurial actions (Stuart & Abetti, 
1990) and are better able to understand the current industry dynamics (Arthur, 1994), the 
novel contacts brought by the outside board will be better understood and thus more valued by 
TMTs with industry experience. As such, we argue that TMTs with industry experience will 
benefit to a larger extent from the outside board’s input. We offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between TMT industry experience and 
outside board service effectiveness. 
 
3.2.4. Learning component 3: Interaction perspective 
A third learning component pertains to the frequency of interaction between student and 
teacher. Indeed, for effective learning to take place, considerable time (Harlow, 1959) and 
intensity of effort (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) are critical. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) indicate 
that interactive learning is the most appropriate to understand new external knowledge as 
students get close enough to learn not just the objective capabilities of their teachers, but also 
the related tacit knowledge. This requires face-to-face, direct and frequent interactions 
between student and teacher (Daft & Huber, 1987) in order to transfer both explicit and tacit 
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Similarly, Nooteboom, Van Haverbeke, Duysters, 
Gilsing and Van den Oord (2007) indicate that, through interactions, individuals with 
different knowledge endowments stimulate each other to stretch their knowledge and to 
bridge knowledge fragments. Hence, in our board learning context, we argue that interactions 
between TMT and outside board will shape learning behaviors as these improve both the 
capacity of the teacher to transmit the knowledge and the capacity of the student to absorb it 
(Foss, Laursen & Pedersen, 2011). As frequency of interaction creates a unique language 
which facilitates knowledge transfer (Steensma & Corley, 2000), it enables the outside board 
and the TMT to share, refine and combine task-relevant knowledge (Van Der Vegt & 
Bunderson, 2005). The most common forum through which the outside board and the TMT 
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have face-to-face, direct and frequent interactions is the board meetings (Conger, Finegold & 
Lawler, 1998). As these interactions are likely to affect the effectiveness of the collective 
learning process (Hinsz, Vollrath, Nagao & Davis, 1988), we argue that more frequent board 
meetings relate to increased levels of outside board service effectiveness. We offer the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings 
and outside board service effectiveness. 
 
3.3. METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1. Sample and data collection 
In this paper we use a hand-collected dataset on early stage high-tech firms in Belgium. 
Three criteria for defining early stage high-tech firms were applied. First, these firms could 
not have existed for more than 10 years (Burgel & Murray, 2000) and were founded between 
2001 and 2011. Second, we selected new ventures from multiple high-tech sectors, as 
classified by Burgel, Fier and Licht (2004). They use the high-tech industries of Butchart 
(1987), complemented by a number of high-tech service sectors. Third, only early stage high-
tech firms with no single external shareholder holding a majority stake were selected (Burgel, 
Fier & Licht, 2004). 
We identified all early stage high-tech firms in Belgium meeting these three conditions by 
using the official public database Bel-First, containing general, financial and board-related 
information on every Belgian company. Applying our selection criteria to this database 
resulted in a sample of 195 firms. Given the focus of our study on outside boards, we 
contacted all firms by telephone to check whether they had at least one outside board member. 
To qualify as an outside board member, an individual could not be part of the top 
management team, its associates or families, not be an employee of the firm or its 
subsidiaries, and not be a member of the immediate past top management group (Pearce & 
Zahra, 1991). In case the contacted firm did not have an outsider on the board, information on 
age, TMT, sector and funding were collected. Of the 195 firms, 55 did not have any outside 
board member and for 37 of these (67%), we received additional information, which is used in 
our analyses to correct for potential selection biases. As a result of this procedure, the sample 
of early stage high-tech firms with an outside board contained 140 ventures.  
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Subsequently, we conducted face-to-face interviews during 2012-2014 with the CEOs of 
firms having an outside board. Although being time-consuming, these face-to-face contacts 
were necessary to retrieve often confidential and sensitive information. Further, this personal 
approach resulted in a high response rate (64%), with 89 of the 140 firms willing to cooperate. 
Further, even though interviewing the CEO is relevant as he or she typically possesses the 
most comprehensive knowledge on the organization’s history, strategy, processes and 
performance (Carter, Stearns, Reynolds & Miller, 1994), we deemed it necessary to collect 
information from multiple sources. As such, we obtained the contact information of all TMT 
and outside board members through the interviewed CEOs. Consequently, every member of 
the TMT as well as all outside board members received a request to fill out an online survey 
about their human capital profile. Out of the 256 TMT members in our dataset, 79 replied to 
our survey (31%), as well as 69 of the 326 outside board members (21%), which allowed us to 
partially validate the data provided by the CEO. Additionally, we double-checked all 
functional background profiles through secondary data on Linked-In (a professional social 
network website).  
 
3.3.2. Measures 
Dependent variable 
Outside board service effectiveness. We used Minichilli et al. (2009)’s measure of service 
involvement and asked the CEOs to indicate how effective the outside board is in performing 
its service tasks. The items were as follows: “How effective is the outside board in (1) 
contributing on management issues (2) contributing on financial issues, (3) contributing on 
technical issues, (4) contributing on market issues, (5) contributing on legal issues and 
taxation, (6) providing linkage to important external stakeholders, (7) providing the firm with 
external legitimacy and reputation, (8) promoting strategic initiatives, (9) long-term strategic 
decision-making and (10) implementing long-term strategic decision-making?”. Responses 
were recorded using a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (highly ineffective) to 7 
(highly effective). The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the summated scale is .82.  
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Independent and moderator variables 
Outside board functional diversity was computed by using Teachman (1980)’s diversity 
scale:       ∑         
 
   . Pfeffer and O’Reilly (1987) have shown that this formula can be 
used to index the heterogeneity in a system (H), where    is the probability that the system 
will be found in state i, if there are N possible states in which the system can be. In our case, P 
represents the proportion of the outside board’s years of working experiences assigned to 
management; marketing, sales and promotion; accounting, controlling and financing; 
engineering and R&D; production; or personnel (Cantner, Goethner & Stuetzer, 2010). The 
outside board diversity index ranges from 0 (indicating a very homogeneous outside board) to 
1.56 (specifying a very diverse outside board). 
TMT industry experience was calculated as the sum of the number of years of experience 
all TMT members had in the same industry as the current firm, at the moment of joining the 
firm. On average, the TMT has 32.24 years of industry experience. 
Frequency of board meetings was measured as the number of board meetings that take 
place on a yearly basis. The firms in our sample on average reported 6.53 board meetings per 
year. 
CEO duality was coded as a dummy variable, equaling 1 if the CEO of the firm was also 
the board chair, 0 otherwise. In 41% of our sample, this dual structure was in place, indicating 
that in 59% of the cases, the CEO and board chair were two different persons. 
Firm underperformance was operationalized based on Fredriksen and Klofsten (1999) by 
asking the CEO to compare the current size of the firm, both in terms of sales and full time 
equivalents (FTEs), to what was foreseen in the business plan at start-up. Responses were 
recorded using a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (the initial business plan had foreseen 
a much lower level of sales/FTEs respectively) to 5 (the initial business plan had foreseen a 
much higher level of sales/FTEs respectively). Afterwards, we reverse coded this measure in 
order to assess the impact of firm underperformance and used the summated scale for sales 
and FTEs. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the summated scale is .88. 
 
Control Variables 
Several other factors may affect the hypothesized relationships. Hence, we control for firm 
age, firm independence, firm industry, venture capital ownership, outsider/insider ratio and 
economic crisis. 
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We control for firm age by taking the natural log of the number of years the new venture 
exists, to ensure that none of the identified effects are the result of age-related processes. The 
sampled early stage high-tech firms are on average 6.90 years old. 
Firm independence is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is an independent start-up 
and 0 otherwise. An independent start-up emerges from the ideas and knowledge of one or 
more independent entrepreneurs (Shrader & Simon, 1997), while dependent start-ups include 
corporate and academic spin-offs. Sixty eight percent of our sample are independent early 
stage high-tech firms. 
Firm industry is controlled for by introducing two dummies: ICT industry and health and 
life sciences industry. These variables equal 1 if the firm belongs to this industry category, 
and 0 otherwise. The rationale for controlling for the technological domain lies in institutional 
theory, which suggests that organizational practices, including those relating to the outside 
board, may be related to industry-specific norms (Eisenhardt, 1988). Fifty two percent of the 
firms in our sample belong to the ICT industry and twenty percent operate in the health and 
life science industry. The category “other industry” is used as the reference category. 
Venture capital ownership is a dummy variable (0/1) indicating whether the firm has raised 
venture capital (VC) or not. Forty four percent of the firms in our sample are VC-backed, 
which is high but not surprising, as this type of financing is often seen as one of the most 
appropriate ways of funding early stage high-tech firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). We 
control for VC financing as outside boards in VC-backed firms may be more actively 
involved in strategic decision making, which is one of the service tasks (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2002). 
Outsider-insider ratio is the proportion of outsiders to insiders in the board room. The 
motivation to control for this variable is that boards with higher proportions of outsiders may 
have more weight attributed to the outsiders in board decision making (Haynes & Hillman, 
2010). The boards in our sample on average have close to three times as many outsiders as 
insiders. 
Economic crisis is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the early stage high-tech firm is founded 
after 2008 and 0 otherwise. Given that the start of the banking crisis has resulted in a weaker 
economic period (Haugh, Ollivaud & Turner, 2009), we control whether being founded after 
this economic crisis might impact the effectiveness of the outside board. On average, 24% of 
the ventures in our sample are founded after 2008. 
 
 63 
 
Table 3-1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used, for 
those firms which have an outside board. 
 
Table 3-1 Means, standard deviations and correlations 
Variables mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Firm age (ln) 1.83 0.48             
2. Firm independence a 0.68 0.47 .21            
3. ICT industry a 0.52 0.50 -.04 .11           
4. Health and life 
sciences industry 
a
 
0.20 0.41 -.17 -.34 -.52          
5. VC ownership a 0.44 0.50 -.09 -.27 -.14 .41         
6. Outsider/insider 
ratio 
2.98 2.09 -.02 -.35 -.21 .37 .39        
7. Economic crisis a 0.24 0.43 -.77 -.10 .03 .09 .07 .05       
8. CEO duality a 0.41 0.49 .06 .29 .19 -.20 -.25 -.28 -.10      
9. Firm under-
performance 
3.67 1.08 .19 .06 .15 -.26 -.14 -.05 -.22 .15     
10. Outside board 
functional diversity 
1.24 0.27 .11 .13 -.03 .09 -.01 .09 -.03 .08 .15    
11. TMT industry 
experience 
32.24 26.49 -.03 -.25 -.19 .49 .42 .28 .18 -.11 -.06 -.01   
12. Number of board 
meetings 
6.53 3.36 -.04 -.06 .03 -.01 -.05 .01 .04 -.01 -.08 -.07 -.18  
13. Outside board 
service effectiveness 
4.12 1.12 -.06 .19 -.33 .16 -.23 -.07 .08 .03 -.11 -.06 .14 .16 
Pearson correlation coefficients (1-tailed), indicating significant correlations (p<.05) in bold. 
a
 Correlations of binary variables should be interpreted with care. 
 
3.4. RESULTS 
As we aim to examine outside board service effectiveness for early stage high-tech firms, 
we only incorporate these ventures with at least one outside board member. This may 
however give rise to potential selectivity biases as those firms without an outside board are 
excluded. Therefore, we use Heckman’s selection procedure to assure that our results are not 
affected by any self-selection effect (Heckman, 1979). Essentially, this selectivity model 
entails a two-stage procedure. In the first stage or the selection equation, a probit regression is 
used to determine whether the early stage high-tech firm has an outside board or not. This 
dummy variable is a function of the venture’s age, independence, industry, venture capital 
ownership, TMT size and firm size. Based upon the results of this first-stage model, we 
predicted and saved the value for the inverse Mill’s ratio (λi), which is the monotone 
decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected into our sample. In the 
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second stage or regression equation, which estimates the outside board service effectiveness 
model, the inverse Mill’s ratio enters as an explanatory variable. This two-stage procedure 
generates consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates (Heckman, 1979). 
 
Table 3-2 Selection equation 
Selection equation (step 1) 
Outside board member 0/1 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Firm age (ln) .19 
Firm independence -.30 
ICT industry -.15 
VC ownership .83** 
TMT size -.11 
Firm size: number of full time equivalents .07** 
Constant .00 
Significance levels:  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
The selection step is presented in Table 3-2 and indicates that larger firms, as well as VC-
backed firms are more likely to have an outside board. These outcomes are not surprising as 
larger firms need more structure and firm size is strongly associated with outside board size 
(Zald, 1969). Moreover, venture capitalists typically require the establishment of an outside 
board and get a seat on the board following their investment (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; 
Gabrielsson & Huse, 2002).  
 
Next, the results of our main regression models (step 2) are presented in Table 3-3. The 
hypotheses were tested using multiple hierarchical regression analysis. In the first model, we 
only included the control variables. In the second model, we added the variables related to our 
set of direct hypotheses, namely outside board functional diversity, TMT industry experience 
and frequency of board meetings. The interaction variables are added in the third model, 
where mean centered observations of the independent variables are used to calculate 
interaction terms in order to avoid multicollinearity problems, which is a standard practice in 
multiple regression analysis (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter & Li, 2005). Moreover, Variance 
Inflation Factors were all below 2.33, indicating that multicollinearity indeed was no issue 
(Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tahal, 2006). All three models are statistically significant. 
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Table 3-3 Regression equation 
Regression equation (step 2) 
Outside board service effectiveness 
Unstandardized coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls    
Firm age (ln) -.09 -.30 -.33 
Firm independence .52* .64** .62* 
ICT industry -.70** -.79** -.80** 
Health and life sciences industry .44 .08 .11 
VC ownership -.62* -.71* -.74* 
Outsider/insider ratio .00 .01 .01 
Economic crisis .24 -.12 -.33 
CEO duality   -.03 
Firm underperformance   -.05 
Independents    
Outside board functional diversity (H1)  -.38 -.62 
TMT industry experience (H3)  .01** .01** 
Frequency of board meetings (H4)  .07* .07** 
Interaction terms    
Outside board functional diversity x CEO duality (H2a)   1.60* 
Outside board functional diversity x firm underperformance (H2b)   .82** 
Constant 4.40*** 4.38*** 4.85*** 
Inverted Mills ratio .07 .31 .53 
Number of observations 126 126 126 
Number of censored observations 37 37 37 
Number of uncensored observations
 
89 89 89 
Wald chi² 26.61*** 43.67*** 59.25*** 
Significance levels:*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; N=89 
 
Model 1 contains control variables only. We find that the firm independence (B=.52, 
p<.05) has a significant positive impact and the ICT dummy (B= -.70, p<.01) and VC 
ownership (B= -.62, p<.05) have a significant negative impact on outside board service 
effectiveness. Adding the independent variables (model 2) led to significant model 
improvements. In this model, the impact of outside board functional diversity on outside 
board service effectiveness is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the impact of 
TMT industry experience (B=.01, p<.01) on outside board service effectiveness is 
significantly positive. Additionally, we find that a higher frequency of board meetings (B=.07, 
p<.05) relates positively to a higher service effectiveness of the outside board. As such, we 
find no support for H1, but support for H3 and H4. 
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Finally, model 3 presents the full model including the interaction terms. We find that both 
CEO duality (B=1.60, p<.05) and firm underperformance (B=.82, p<.01) positively moderate 
the relationship between outside board functional diversity and outside board service 
effectiveness. Thus, our evidence supports H2a and H2b. We visualize the significant 
moderation effects of CEO duality and firm underperformance in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 
respectively. Figure 3-2 indicates no distinct difference of the impact of low or high outside 
board functional diversity on outside board service effectiveness if there is no CEO duality. 
However, when the CEO also holds the board chair position, the outside board service 
effectiveness improves and this effect is even more pronounced for functionally more diverse 
outside boards. 
 
Figure 3-2 Outside board functional diversity x CEO duality 
 
 
Figure 3-3 shows that, in case of low outside board functional diversity, the outside board 
is particularly effective in its service tasks when the firm is experiencing high 
underperformance. This effect is then strengthened as outside boards become more 
functionally diverse. In what follows, we discuss our findings and implications. 
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Figure 3-3 Outside board functional diversity x firm underperformance 
 
 
3.4.1. Robustness check: marginal effect outside board functional diversity 
Although the interaction coefficient of outside board functional diversity and firm 
underperformance is significant, we calculate the marginal effect as the interaction might not 
be significant for all values of the moderating variable (Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006; Kam 
& Franzese, 2007). In an interactive model, the effect of any independent variable X on the 
dependent variable Y is not a single constant, but depends on the coefficients of X, the 
moderating variable Z and the interaction term XZ (Brambor, et al., 2006). 
 
The marginal effect of X in our interaction model 
                                       , 
is  
  
  
        , 
with Y = outside board service effectiveness, 
X = outside board functional diversity and 
Z = firm underperformance. 
 
In order to correctly interpret the marginal effect, we took into account the relevant 
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by Brambor, et al. (2006). The solid line in Figure 3-4 shows the marginal effect of outside 
board functional diversity on outside board service effectiveness, the dotted lines represent the 
95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3-4 Marginal effect of outside board service effectiveness on outside board 
diversity as firm underperformance changes 
 
 
Thus, the outside board functional diversity – outside board service effectiveness 
relationship is significant when both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval 
are above (or below) the zero line. At this point, it is clear that outside board functional 
diversity has a significant positive effect on the service effectiveness of the outside board 
when the level of firm underperformance is higher or equal to 2. Hence, a minimum level of 
firm underperformance is necessary in order to translate outside board functional diversity 
into higher levels of outside board service effectiveness which is in line with the arguments of 
learning theory. 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Prior research has focused on outside boards in large and established firms, hereby 
studying the importance of the outside board’s control tasks. By investigating under which 
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circumstances the outside board in an early stage high-tech environment engages in its service 
tasks and is found effective by the TMT, we respond to recent calls by Krause et al. (2014) 
and Knockaert et al. (2014) to study the outside board’s service involvement in an 
entrepreneurial context. Building on learning theory and the attention based view, we 
examined the impact of three learning components on outside board service effectiveness and 
considered the moderating effects of structural and contextual factors. 
First, although outside boards with an extensive knowledge base can be highly valuable in 
advising the TMT (Kor & Misangyi, 2008), our results did not support our assumption that 
outside board functional diversity relates positively to outside board service effectiveness. 
However, while we did not obtain a direct effect between outside board functional diversity 
and outside board service effectiveness, we found that in combination with structural and 
contextual factors, outside board functional diversity affects the service effectiveness 
experienced by the TMT. Particularly, we observed that more outside board functional 
diversity was related to higher levels of outside board service effectiveness when CEO duality 
was in place, or when the firm was performing below expectations. By integrating learning 
theory and the attention based view of the firm, we contend that having outside board 
functional diversity is an insufficient condition for outside boards to contribute effectively to 
the TMT through their service tasks. The contribution of a diverse outside board is 
remarkably valuable if structural (i.e. CEO duality) or contextual (i.e. firm underperformance) 
factors direct the outside board’s attention towards service engagement in the focal firm or in 
those service activities which are most relevant to the TMT. Second, we argued that the TMT 
needs a basic level of expertise, i.e. absorptive capacity, in order to learn from the service 
engagement of the outside board. Our results indeed show a positive relationship between 
TMT industry experience and outside board service effectiveness, indicating that the TMT 
itself should also have a basic understanding in order to understand the information provided 
by the outside board. Finally, we found that the frequency of board meetings plays an 
important role in the learning process. Through these interactions outside boards and TMTs 
are able to share relevant and often tacit knowledge, leading to higher levels of outside board 
service effectiveness. 
 
Our research has important implications for academia, (high-tech) entrepreneurs and policy 
makers. For academia, our paper contributes to both entrepreneurship and corporate 
governance research that has primarily focused on the control function of the outside board, 
often in large corporations (e.g. Conyon & Peck, 1998). Yet, in an entrepreneurial (high-tech) 
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context, the contribution of the outside board through its engagement in the service tasks is 
particularly relevant, as early stage (high-tech) ventures need advice, strategic input and 
network access (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2007) given the gaps in their human capital 
base and the demanding and rapidly changing environment they are operating in (Zahra & 
George, 2002). As such, a first contribution lies in the study of how and when outside boards 
contribute through their service tasks. Subsequently, by particularly focusing on outside board 
service effectiveness, and when outside board interventions matter as opposed to what outside 
boards do, we respond to a recent call by Machold and Farquhar (2013) to disentangle the 
relationships between outside board involvement, effectiveness and task performance. 
Second, this paper adds to the board capital literature by showing that merely adding human 
capital through the outside board may be a necessary, but insufficient condition for outside 
board service effectiveness. Indeed, so far, studies have typically looked at outside board 
structure and composition, applying a board capital perspective to examine the outside board 
service involvement (e.g. Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Haynes & Hillman, 2010). We 
complement these studies by focusing on the effectiveness of the outside board service 
engagement on the one hand, and by unraveling the situations and contexts in which outside 
board capital is more or less beneficial to such effectiveness on the other hand. Third, our 
research contributes by integrating the TMT, often studied in entrepreneurship studies, and 
the outside board, often addressed in corporate governance literature. In doing so, we show 
that, in order to understand outside board service effectiveness in early stage high-tech firms, 
TMT and outside board characteristics are equally important. As such, we respond to calls to 
examine boards and TMTs together instead of considering them as standalone entities 
(Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Nielsen, 2010; Machold et al., 
2011). Finally, we contribute by showing how the attention based view can purposefully 
complement learning theory and lead to complementary insights. Particularly, we find 
structural and situational attention to be important mechanisms complementing the learning 
processes. 
 
Our study has implications for (high-tech) entrepreneurs and their stakeholders too. 
Specifically, our results show that outside board service effectiveness will not necessarily 
increase if the outside board has higher levels of functional diversity, as this is dependent on 
specific structural and contextual factors. Indeed, as outside board members often hold 
multiple board positions (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003), they have to distribute their 
time over these positions. Therefore, if they are kept informed by the CEO-chair and are 
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triggered by the firm’s underperformance, highly diverse outside boards become more 
engaged in their service tasks. Moreover, TMTs should have sufficient absorptive capacity in 
order to benefit from the outside boards’ engagement in their service tasks. Further, our 
findings point to the importance of face-to-face interaction between TMT and outside board in 
order for the outside board to share its knowledge and for the TMT to learn from the outside 
board’s engagement in its service tasks. 
 
Finally, our results are also relevant to policy makers. Although many governments have 
built schemes to assist firms in attracting outside board members (Conyon, Peck & Read, 
2001), our research emphasizes the need for a more tailored approach when supporting high-
tech entrepreneurs: the process of attaining new outside board members should take into 
account the learning capabilities of the TMT in order for outside board interventions to reach 
their full potential. 
 
3.6. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although our research has a number of implications, it also has limitations which may lead 
to future research directions. First, our research design was cross-sectional. Further research 
could adopt a longitudinal design to shed light on how outside board service effectiveness 
evolves over time and how TMT and outside board changes affect this service effectiveness. 
Second, our findings build on a sample of firms established in a specific country, namely 
Belgium. While exclusively focusing on Belgium had the advantage that face-to-face 
interviews with the CEO could be organized and a large percentage of the population could be 
surveyed, it has the disadvantage that the results could be more difficult to generalize to other 
regions. Future studies could therefore analyze the extent to which our results hold in other 
contexts. Third, our results indicated that face-to-face interactions are important. Therefore, it 
might be relevant to further explore board functioning and communication patterns, for 
example by investigating the type of board meetings, the specific agenda and how the outside 
board allocates its time. Additionally, while board meetings are the most prominent forum 
where the outside board and the TMT meet face-to-face, it could be interesting to study the 
impact of other ways of interaction, for instance by employing qualitative research designs 
such as action research or participant observation.   
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3.7. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examined the relationship between the learning components of an early 
stage high-tech firm, namely outside board functional diversity, TMT absorptive capacity and 
frequency of board meetings, and outside board service effectiveness. We further looked at 
the moderating effects of CEO duality and firm underperformance as important structural and 
contextual determinants of attentional focus. Our findings show that outside board service 
effectiveness is positively influenced by TMT industry experience and frequency of board 
meetings. Additionally, both CEO duality and firm underperformance positively moderate the 
relationship between outside board functional diversity and outside board service 
effectiveness. Our findings emphasize the importance of jointly studying TMT and outside 
board characteristics in order to understand outside board service effectiveness in early stage 
high-tech firms.  
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4. OUTSIDE BOARD HUMAN CAPITAL AND EARLY STAGE 
HIGH-TECH FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Early stage high-tech firms are confronted with a number of challenges related to the 
homogeneous and technical nature of the start-up team. Attracting outside board members can 
alleviate these challenges and consequently enhance firm performance. Building on team 
production and human capital theory, we study how outside board human capital affects 
technological and market performance. Our results, based on a longitudinal panel dataset 
consisting of 562 firm-year observations in 80 young high-tech ventures in Belgium, show 
that outside board specific experience, diversity and tenure are important determinants of firm 
performance. We discuss implications for research and practice. 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Early stage high-tech entrepreneurship can contribute to innovation, employment 
generation and regional development (Oakey, 1995). Yet, early stage (high-tech) firms face a 
number of challenges, commonly referred to as the liabilities of newness and smallness 
(Henderson, 1999). The lack of track record and legitimacy makes it difficult for these firms 
to acquire the needed resources from the environment (Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013). 
Further, early stage high-tech firms (hereafter ESHTFs) focus on innovation and typically 
operate in highly uncertain and changing environments (Garg, 2013). It is hardly surprising 
therefore that high technology entrepreneurship is often a collective activity.  
Although frequently founded by teams, many ESHTFs have significant gaps in their 
human resource and knowledge base (Han & Benson, 2010). While the top management 
teams (TMTs) in these firms typically have superior technical skills, they tend to have more 
limited business development and general management experience (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999). These TMTs are likely to select team members from their own networks, resulting in 
teams which are often homogeneous in terms of education, industry experience, functional 
expertise and skills (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005). At the same time, the strategic leadership of 
early stage entrepreneurial firms does not just comprise the TMT but also the board of 
directors which includes outside board members (Daily, McDougall, Covin & Dalton, 2002). 
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TMTs and boards are not standalone entities (Nielsen, 2010), especially in ESHTFs, where 
outside boards
7
 can be considered part of the “extended TMT” (Vanaelst, Clarysse, Wright, 
Lockett, Moray & S’Jegers, 2006; Zhang, Baden-Fuller & Pool, 2011). Hence, ESHTFs can 
overcome the aforementioned challenges by drawing on inside TMT members and outside 
board members. 
In this study we explore the link between the human capital of the outside board and 
performance in ESHTFs (above and beyond the human capital of the TMT), thereby 
contributing to the understanding of (technology) entrepreneurship as well as the governance 
of entrepreneurial firms. We focus on human capital for two reasons. First, human capital has 
been found to be particularly important for new venture performance (Unger, Rauch, Frese & 
Rosenbusch, 2011). An important source of human capital for new ventures is the TMT 
(Ucbasaran, Lockett, Wright & Westhead, 2003) and the human capital of the TMT 
contributes to superior firm performance (e.g. Amason, Shrader & Tompson, 2006; Colombo 
& Grilli, 2010). The role of the outside boards’ human capital has however received more 
limited attention. We therefore study how outside board members could fill important gaps in 
the TMT’s human capital base and subsequently influence firm performance. Second, 
although human capital is associated with firm performance, the performance of ESHTFs is a 
contentious issue. Traditional measures of new venture financial performance such as growth 
and business volume may be less useful for early stage high-tech businesses (Chandler & 
Hanks, 1993) as they might be loss-making while developing market presence (Dai & Liu, 
2009). Thus, our second motivation is to understand the nature of the relationship between 
outside board human capital and early stage high-tech firm performance in particular. 
Building on Gans and Stern (2003) we argue that ESHTF performance is heterogeneous and 
that the appropriate performance indicator is contingent on the strategy being pursued by the 
firm. Accordingly, we differentiate between technological performance and market 
performance and ask “which aspects of outside board human capital matter to which aspects 
of early stage high-tech firm performance?”. Before presenting our conceptual framework, we 
first elaborate on ESHTF performance and how it can be assessed. 
 
                                                 
7
 We refer to the outside board as the board of directors without insiders. Outside board members are defined 
following Pearce and Zahra (1991): they are (1) no members of the TMT, their associates or families, (2) no 
employees of the firm or its subsidiaries, and (3) no members of the immediate past top management group. 
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4.2. EARLY STAGE HIGH-TECH FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Gans and Stern (2003) contend that early stage high-tech companies operate in either a 
market for ideas or a market for products, because they typically lack resources to pursue both 
strategies simultaneously (Bhide, 2000). Those operating in the market for ideas focus on 
building a strong technology position whilst allowing other parties to commercialize their 
technological developments. In contrast, those operating in the market for products 
concentrate on bringing new products to the market. It is important therefore to take into 
account that companies may follow different strategies, and to assess both technological 
performance which is appropriate for those operating in the market for ideas and market 
performance which is appropriate for those operating in the market for products. First, 
considering technological performance, both speed to first patent and degree of patent activity 
are important indicators. Given that windows of opportunity for ESHTFs close quickly 
(Knockaert, Ucbasaran, Wright & Clarysse, 2011), the speed at which technology is 
developed and patents are filed will be of major importance. Specifically, patents allow firms 
to sustainably differentiate themselves from competition (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000) and 
help gain competitive advantage (Audretsch, Keilbach & Lehmann, 2006). Patenting is one 
the most widely used methods of protecting gains from technological investments (Arundel, 
2001). Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) observe that patenting represents the most 
effective means of protecting new ventures' technological resources because other means may 
not be feasible and indicate patents to be the most marketable asset. Indeed, patent protection 
helps companies to appropriate the returns from R&D investments and facilitates technology 
commercialization (Cohen et al., 2000; Dechenaux, Goldfarb, Shane & Thursby, 2008) by 
delaying imitation by others (Teece, 1986). Second, considering market performance, both 
speed to first product and degree of new product generation are important performance 
measures. Bringing a first product to the market is a major milestone for new high-tech 
organizations; the speed at which such an organization manages to sell its first product is 
important to accelerate financial independence, to gain visibility, legitimacy and early market 
share, and to increase the likelihood of survival (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt & Lyman, 1990). 
Yet, the ability to develop multiple new products is also crucial in high-tech industries (Loch, 
Stein & Terwiesch, 1996) as the rate at which a firm develops new products is critical for 
achieving and maintaining first-mover advantages (Dees & Hill, 1996). The number of 
products a firm markets has been frequently used as a measure of market performance (Tsai, 
2001; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1996). We now outline the theories we use to 
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explain our hypothesized relationships between outside board human capital and early stage 
high-tech firm performance. 
 
4.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In selecting our conceptual framework we had two inter-related considerations: the theory 
should be fit for purpose (i.e. suitable to the context of ESHTFs) and should help us explain 
the relationship between the outside board and early stage high-tech firm performance. The 
relationship between the role and composition of the outside board and firm performance has 
been studied extensively, with agency theory being the dominant theoretical framework. 
Recent studies (e.g. Zhang et al., 2011; Garg, 2013) question the suitability of agency theory 
to explain the role and influence of the outside board in early stage entrepreneurial firms. For 
example, Garg (2013) argues that in entrepreneurial firms, there is much less separation of 
ownership and control and thus the agency problem of monitoring TMT members with 
misaligned financial incentives is less central than in large firms. Rather than a control role, 
outside board members are more likely to perform a service role (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; 
Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) in entrepreneurial firms. This service role 
involves providing access to resources (Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) and 
increasing the firm’s legitimacy (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 2001). The hitherto dominant agency 
theory may, therefore, lack power when explaining the relationship between outside boards 
and performance in ESHTFs. We argue that the team production theory of the firm (Blair & 
Stout, 1999; Machold, Huse, Minichilli & Nordqvist, 2011) is a more appropriate theoretical 
perspective in the context of (high-tech) entrepreneurial firms. Team production occurs when 
several types of resources (information, talents, skills, and visions) are used and where the 
product is not just the sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). According to team production theory, firms are viewed as a nexus of team-
specific assets, invested by shareholders, board members, managers and other stakeholders 
who hope to benefit from team production (Kaufman & Englander, 2005; Gabrielsson, Huse 
& Minichilli, 2007). A central concept in team production theory is the mediating hierarchy 
whose function is to encourage firm-specific investment in team production (Blair & Stout, 
1999). In a firm, this function is performed by the board which is at the apex of the firm’s 
decision-making. In entrepreneurial firms where there is a critical need for resources, team 
production can be a valuable theoretical lens because each outside board member brings 
specific and firm relevant knowledge to the team (Kaufman & Englander, 2005). 
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Accordingly, outside boards can be seen as knowledgeable and cooperative team members 
that contribute to firms’ value creation through their service role (Gabrielsson et al., 2007; 
Machold et al., 2011). Yet, because the ability to add value is a function of what resources 
team members bring to the team as well as the ability to share and combine these resources, 
we argue that team production theory needs to be supplemented with human capital theory. 
Human capital and the knowledge embedded within (particularly tacit knowledge) has 
been presented as the most universally valuable and imperfectly imitable resource (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr & Ketchen, 2011). Human capital consists of 
achieved attributes, work experience and habits which are linked to productivity and firm 
performance (Becker, 1975; Crook, et al., 2011). Therefore, in order to understand when 
outside boards in ESHTFs add value, it is important to take into account their human capital 
profile whilst controlling for the human capital of the TMT. 
In what follows we use team production theory as an overarching conceptual framework to 
develop hypotheses on the relationship between outside board human capital and the 
performance of ESHTFs. We respectively focus on outside board specific experience, 
functional diversity and tenure which have been identified as major determinants of outside 
board human capital (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2013). 
 
4.3.1. Outside board specific experience and ESHTF performance 
Team production theory espouses that the ability of the outside board to contribute to the 
firm’s value creating capabilities will be greatest when its members provide access to 
knowledge and skills that are specific to the firm and industry (Kauffman & Englander, 
2005). This is in line with human capital theorists who argue that the more specific the human 
capital to the context of the work being performed, the greater the economic rents generated 
from that human capital (Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005). In the context of 
the ESHTF, the service role of the outside board may relate to tasks oriented towards gaining 
technological or market presence by operating in the market for ideas or the market for 
products, respectively (Gans & Stern, 2003). 
We first consider the relationship between outside board specific experience and 
technological performance. As intimated earlier, ESHTFs require outside board members who 
possess knowledge of the technological intricacies of their firm’s products and their 
production and development (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). High technology ventures, 
particularly those seeking to gain technological presence in the market, require extensive new 
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knowledge creation and/or technological synthesis which call for high levels of technical 
expertise (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Additionally, as a new venture needs to quickly 
gain technical capabilities to compete in rapidly changing markets, more technical expertise 
may enhance the firm’s performance (McGee & Dowling, 1994). While the TMTs of ESHTFs 
tend to be populated by individuals with technical expertise, outside board members may 
supplement the ventures’ internal knowledge and skills (Machold et al., 2011). As such, we 
expect outside board R&D experience to strengthen the task-specific human capital needed to 
reinforce technological performance, as demonstrated through both speed to first patent 
application and degree of patent activity. We offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Higher levels of outside board R&D experience positively affect 
technological performance. 
 
Firms operating on a market for products may benefit from other types of outside board 
specific human capital. In this case, outside board members are particularly likely to add 
value if they possess knowledge on how to serve product markets. Prior knowledge of ways to 
serve markets, acquired through sales and marketing experience, provides access to 
information about how a technology can be developed or packaged as a product or service 
that satisfies customer needs (Marvel, 2013). Indeed, investing in specific human capital 
tailored to the firm’s competitive needs, allows the firm to create value by generating new 
products (Kaufman & Englander, 2005). As such, we argue that having outside board 
members with specific marketing and sales experience will enhance market performance. 
Such experience may help to reach the first milestone related to market performance, namely 
shipping the first product for revenues, and to build a product portfolio. We offer the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Higher levels of outside board marketing and sales experience positively 
affect market performance. 
 
4.3.2. Outside board functional diversity and ESHTF performance 
An outside board that is formed following the principles of team production theory would 
comprise diverse members, each of whom brings important resources that contribute to firm 
value creation (Kauffman & Englander, 2005). Indeed, the knowledge and skills needed to 
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effectively manage an early stage high-tech business are unlikely to be contained within the 
TMT let alone a single entrepreneur. The presence of a diverse outside board might alleviate 
the burden on the TMT. The outside board’s functional background diversity captures how 
much outside board members differ from each other in their experiences, competences, skills 
and perspectives (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). Group processes literature tells us, 
however, that capitalizing on this diversity is not straightforward. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the evidence on the relationship between TMT diversity and performance (e.g. 
Simons, Pelled & Smith, 1999; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004) as well as outside 
board diversity and performance (Johnson et al., 2013) is not conclusive. 
While diversity increases the aggregate level of resources at the group’s disposal, it is a 
double edged sword; diversity is also associated with higher levels of conflict, communication 
problems as well as lower levels of information sharing and integration (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). These potential consequences of diversity may be 
particularly pronounced for outside boards because its members only interact periodically and 
thus have fewer opportunities to address the differences that separate them (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). In such circumstances, a certain degree of homogeneity might strengthen the 
relational fabric between group members.  
Scholars are increasingly moving towards a contingency perspective to understand the 
relationship between diversity and performance, suggesting that environmental and task 
characteristics might influence this relationship (Joshi & Roh, 2009). House, Filley and Kerr 
(1971) found that routine problem solving is best handled by a homogeneous group, while ill-
defined, novel problem solving is best handled by a heterogeneous group, in which diversity 
of opinion, knowledge and background allows a thorough airing of alternatives. While 
technological development can be hardly seen as a routine activity, it may require a more 
homogenous human capital profile as the development of technology is a largely technical 
challenge and requires extensive technical human capital. Michel and Hambrick (1992) argue 
that a common functional background helps develop “common schemata among team 
members and thereby increases cohesion by promoting a common premise for decision-
making” (p.18). The common schemata associated with functionally homogeneous teams can 
increase communication, facilitate the ability to achieve consensus and reduce conflict, all of 
which contributes to speedy and efficient coordination (Hambrick, Cho & Chen, 1996; 
Carpenter, 2002). Therefore, we anticipate homogeneity, rather than diversity, of functional 
background to facilitate technological development. Evidence, although in different contexts, 
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suggests that technological output is strengthened when collaborating parties have similar 
backgrounds as it facilitates knowledge sharing (Ahuja, 2000; Sampson, 2007). 
It follows that, although outside board diversity may bring more breadth of knowledge and 
different approaches to problem solving (Tuggle, Schnatterly & Johnson, 2010), it may have 
an adverse effect on team production (in this case technological development) by lowering 
group cohesiveness (Keller, 2001). Therefore, given that technological development may be 
seen as a task mainly requiring a highly technical skill set, we argue that, controlling for TMT 
human capital and diversity, outside boards bringing functional diversity are likely to have a 
negative impact on technological performance. We offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Higher levels of outside board diversity negatively affect technological 
performance. 
 
Outside board diversity is also likely to influence market performance albeit in a different 
way. Firms need a range of skills to bring products to market: they require experts in R&D, 
manufacturing and marketing in their organizational structure in order to quickly and 
successfully bring a first product to the market (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Indeed, product 
development and marketing processes are made possible by diverse new product teams 
because they solve an information-processing problem by bringing together people from 
different disciplines with distinct expertise (Keller, 2001). As such, diversity in experience in 
the functional domains leads to a decrease in the time to commercialize new products and 
strengthens the product portfolio by allowing products to be technically developed and 
manufactured whilst also being designed to respond to customer needs (Schoonhoven et al., 
1990). Since many high-tech TMTs are homogenous, comprising mainly of members with 
technical expertise (Mosey & Wright, 2007), we argue that functionally diverse outside 
boards can add value to the firm by bringing missing human capital to the early stage high-
tech TMT, in turn promoting market performance. We offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Higher levels of outside board diversity positively affect market 
performance. 
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4.3.3. Outside board tenure and ESHTF performance 
As social systems, the ability of outside boards to contribute to firms’ value creation is 
influenced by how well outside board members share knowledge and interact (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). Machold et al. (2011) argue that board development processes are essential 
in order to transform a collection of outside board members into a team that can contribute to 
firm value creation. During their tenure on the board, outside board members build up firm-
specific human capital (Johnson et al., 2013). From a team production perspective, this firm-
specific human capital allows them to make more valuable contributions to team production 
(Blair & Stout, 1999; Machold et al., 2011). Over time, outside board members develop a 
greater understanding of the company’s needs and are better able to interpret the information 
provided by executive board members, allowing outside board members to enhance their 
monitoring and advising capabilities (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Changes in board 
composition can temporarily reduce team production (Machold et al, 2011) by influencing 
team coordination and information transfer (Summers, Humphrey & Ferris, 2012). Thus, with 
greater outside board tenure, we expect outside board members to develop firm-specific 
human capital and capabilities that can contribute to the performance of ESHTFs, both from a 
technological and market perspective. 
First, we expect greater outside board tenure to positively affect technological 
performance. Positive team dynamics emerge through shared experience and time spent 
together (Foss, Klein, Kor & Mahoney, 2008). Accordingly, the longer the outside board 
members serve on the board, the better they can assess the needs of the firm and its 
engagement in the technology development process. Moreover, the firm-specific knowledge 
that accrues through greater tenure will help the outside board to make quicker and more 
informed decisions on technological issues, such as patent applications which represent an 
important way to show the firm’s commitment to getting an idea commercialized (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, Ireland & Harrison, 1991). We therefore expect that greater outside board tenure 
will contribute favorably to technological performance, both in terms of speed to first patent 
application and the degree of patent activity, and offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Higher levels of outside board tenure positively affect technological 
performance. 
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Likewise, we argue that firm-specific human capital in the outside board generated through 
tenure, will positively affect market performance. Developing new products and processes is 
learned by doing (Schoonhoven, et al., 1990; Delmar & Shane, 2002). As outside board 
members reside for a longer period on the board, they get more acquainted with the company 
and are better able to advise the company on first and subsequent product introductions. 
Further, outside board members will interact more frequently if they serve longer on the 
board, which leads to a more effective use of their knowledge base (Postrel, 2002), generates 
new knowledge (Rutherford & Buchholz, 2007), and leads to the generation of new ideas for 
product development (Tsai, 2001). These positive developments that result from greater 
tenure translate into quicker time to market for products (Datar, Jordan, Kekre, Rajiv & 
Srinivasan, 1997) and a higher level of subsequent product introductions. These arguments 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Higher levels of outside board tenure positively affect market performance. 
 
Figure 4-1 summarizes our research hypotheses. 
 
Figure 4-1 Conceptual framework 
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4.4. METHODS 
4.4.1. Sample and data collection 
Our study relies on a unique longitudinal data set of ESHTFs in Belgium constructed in 
2011-2013. Using the official public database Bel-First, containing general, financial and 
board-related information on every Belgian company, we identified all ESHTFs in Belgium. 
These are ventures that were operating in high-tech sectors as classified by Burgel, Fier and 
Licht (2004), were no more than 10 years old (Burgel & Murray, 2000), and had no single 
external shareholder holding a majority stake (Burgel, et al., 2004). This process yielded a 
sample of 179 firms. 
Given our focus on outside boards, we contacted all firms by telephone to check whether 
they had at least one outside board member – an individual who was not part of the top 
management team, its associates or families, not an employee of the firm or its subsidiaries, 
and not a member of the immediate past top management group (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). To 
correct for any potential selectivity biases, we collected data on the TMT, age, sector and 
funding for each firm irrespective of whether they had an outside board. As 50 firms did not 
have an outsider on the board, the usable population consisted of 129 ESHTFs. 
The longitudinal data were collected during face-to-face interviews with the firms’ CEOs 
in 2012 and 2013. While time-consuming, these interviews were necessary to retrieve often 
confidential and sensitive information. Further, this personal approach resulted in a high 
response rate (62%), with 80 of the 129 firms willing to cooperate. Specifically, the primary 
data contain longitudinal information on the outside board’s human capital, the TMT’s human 
capital, the new venture’s performance and a number of firm-related variables, such as 
venture ownership. In addition, we obtained the contact information of all TMT and outside 
board members through the interviewed CEOs and requested them to fill out an online survey. 
Out of the 239 TMT members in our dataset, 83 replied to our survey (35%), as well as 75 of 
the 315 outside board members (24%), which allowed us to validate the TMT and outside 
board data provided by the CEO. Additionally, we verified the received responses with 
information gathered from other secondary sources such as Bel-First, Espacenet and 
LinkedIn, to ensure data reliability. 
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4.4.2. Measures 
Dependent variables 
Our dependent variables include technological and market performance to capture ESHTF 
performance. Technological performance includes time to first patent filing and number of 
patent filings. Given the early stage nature of the sampled firms, patent filings are more 
relevant than patents granted as it takes considerable time before a patent application 
translates into a patent granted. Further, in an early stage high-tech context, patent 
applications represent value before they turn into patents or before the technology is 
commercialized, through a signaling mechanism in which they signal patent race leads in the 
race for additional resources (Silverman & Baum, 2002). Patent filed takes a value of 1 when 
the first patent is applied for. Number of patent filings are measured as the number of patents 
that were applied for. Likewise, market performance comprises time to first product and 
number of products. Product launched takes a value of 1 when the first product is shipped for 
revenues. Number of products indicates the number of products the company has on the 
market.  
 
Independent Variables 
Outside board R&D experience measures the total number of years of experience the 
outside board has in engineering or R&D. Outside board marketing and sales experience is 
the total number of years of experience the outside board has in marketing or sales. These 
specific outside board experiences can vary yearly due to changes in the outside board’s 
composition. Outside board diversity is calculated using Teachman (1980)’s diversity 
measure:       ∑         
 
   . Pfeffer and O’Reilly (1987) have shown that this formula 
can be used to index the heterogeneity in a system (H), where    is the probability that the 
system will be found in state i, if there are N possible states in which the system can be. In our 
case, P represents the proportion of the outside board’s years of working experience assigned 
to management; marketing, sales & promotion; accounting, controlling & financing; 
engineering & R&D; production; or personnel (Canter, Goethner & Stuetzer, 2010). The 
outside board diversity index ranges from 0 (indicating a very uniform outside board in terms 
of working experiences) to 1.70 (specifying a very diverse outside board). Outside board 
tenure is measured as the total number of years the outside board members have served on the 
board. For example, when four members sit on the outside board, their total tenure after the 
first year will be four, after the second year eight, etc. When a new outside board member 
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enters after some time, his/her personal tenure starts at one and will be added to the outside 
board tenure of the other members. If an outside board member leaves, the total tenure will 
reflect the tenure of the remaining outside board members.  
 
Control Variables 
Firm characteristics. We control for firm age by taking the natural log of the number of 
years the new venture exists, to ensure that none of the identified effects are the result of age-
related processes. Firm independence is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is an 
independent start-up and 0 otherwise. An independent start-up emerges from the ideas and 
knowledge of one or more independent entrepreneurs, while dependent start-ups include 
corporate and academic spin-offs. This control variable is necessary as the presence of a 
related corporation, university or public institute can influence the speed of technological 
development (Perez & Sanchez, 2003). Firm industry is controlled for by introducing two 
dummies: ICT industry and health and life sciences industry. These variables equal 1 if the 
firm belongs to this industry category, and 0 otherwise. The rationale for controlling for the 
technological domain lies in institutional theory, which suggests that organizational practices, 
including those relating to the outside board, may be related to industry specific norms 
(Eisenhardt, 1988).  
 
Board characteristics. The frequency of board meetings is measured as the number of 
board meetings organized on a yearly basis (Vafeas, 1999). The more frequently board 
meetings are held, the better informed outside board members are about the firm, which is 
necessary for both monitoring performance (Demb & Neubauer, 1992) and providing tailored 
support. We further control for CEO duality because by creating a centralized representative, 
duality can enhance clarity and flexibility particularly in a dynamic high-tech environment 
(Gabrielsson, 2007). CEO duality equals 1 if the CEO of the company is also the board chair, 
0 otherwise. VC ownership is a dummy variable (0/1) indicating whether the company has 
raised venture capital financing or not. We control for VC ownership as VC-backed ESHTFs 
have been found to outperform non-VC-backed firms (Baum & Silverman, 2004). 
 
TMT characteristics. Previous research has shown that TMT human capital may affect 
firm performance (Amason, Shrader & Tompson, 2006; Colombo & Grilli, 2010). 
Consequently, we control for TMT specific experience, diversity and tenure. TMT R&D 
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experience is the total number of years the TMT is skilled in engineering or R&D. TMT 
marketing and sales experience is the total number of years the TMT is experienced in 
marketing or sales. We control for TMT diversity calculated by Teachman (1980)’s diversity 
measure:       ∑         
 
   . In line with the calculation of the outside board diversity, P 
represents the proportion of the TMT’s years of working experience assigned to management; 
marketing, sales & promotion; accounting, controlling & financing; engineering & R&D; 
production; or personnel (Canter, et al., 2010). TMT tenure is measured as the total number of 
years the TMT members belonged to the TMT. 
 
Table 4-1 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables used. 
 
4.4.3. Analytical techniques 
For every ESHTF in our sample, we created observations for each year of the firm’s 
existence, starting from the founding year. As these ventures were established between 2001 
and 2011, we have a maximum of 11 observations per venture. The later the venture was 
founded, the fewer the number of observations available. In total, our dataset consists of 562 
firm-year observations. 
 
Because our dependent variables include continuous and dichotomous variables, we used 
two different analytical techniques. First, for the continuous dependent variables (“number of 
patent filings” and “number of products”), we used pooled OLS panel data regression analysis 
and report the robust standard errors for each regression coefficient (models 2 and 4 in Table 
4-2). Besides being heteroskedasticity consistent, these standard error estimates are robust to 
general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence (Discoll & Kraay, 1998). Given 
our longitudinal unbalanced dataset, the Stata xtscc program is the most appropriate (Hoechle, 
2007). As causal inference is facilitated by the temporal precedence of the independent 
variables to the dependent variables, we lead the dependent variables by one year (Finkel, 
1995; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). As such, we assume that outside board characteristics will only 
have an impact on firm performance in the next year, thereby limiting potential endogeneity 
issues (Brav, 2009).   
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Table 4-1 Means, standard deviations and correlations 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Firm age (ln) 1.29 0.71                   
2. Firm independence a 0.69 0.46 .06                  
3. ICT industry a 0.52 0.50 -.05 .13                 
4. Health & life sciences 
industry 
a
 
0.20 0.40 -.04 -.32 -.52      
          
5. Frequency of board 
meetings 
6.32 3.18 .00 .01 -.04 .06     
          
6. CEO duality a 0.41 0.49 -.00 .25 .22 -.12 .00              
7. VC ownership a 0.39 0.49 .14 -.17 -.09 .36 -.08 -.14             
8. TMT R&D experience 17.36 16.17 .03 -.21 -.14 .46 -.09 -.14 .25            
9. TMT marketing and sales 
experience 
5.02 7.78 .13 -.07 -.04 .03 -.11 -.12 .27 .13 
          
10. TMT diversity 0.94 0.49 .08 -.17 -.09 .19 -.27 -.09 .33 .15 .42          
11. TMT tenure 10.41 9.38 .62 -.06 -.09 .12 -.10 -.14 .30 .31 .40 .39         
12. Outside board R&D 
experience 
13.59 14.51 .13 -.40 -.14 .29 -.12 -.16 .39 .29 .12 .16 .22        
13. Outside board marketing 
and sales experience 
6.23 7.37 .10 .14 .01 -.11 .04 -.03 .04 .00 .07 .02 .09 .04       
14. Outside board diversity 1.11 0.49 .27 -.06 -.07 .15 -.11 -.02 .25 .21 .07 .20 .24 .32 .29      
15. Outside board tenure 12.44 12.67 .56 -.19 -.17 .15 -.17 -.06 .23 .28 .16 .21 .60 .49 .16 .40     
16. Patent filed a 0.32 0.47 .12 -.21 -.27 .44 .08 -.21 .24 .37 .06 .08 .16 .28 .02 .13 .25    
17. Number of patent filings 1.96 6.01 .18 -.28 -.18 .29 -.07 -.12 .23 .27 .15 .19 .34 .30 -.04 .11 .40 .48   
18. Product launched a 0.66 0.47 .31 .18 .29 -.57 -.14 .19 -.20 -.25 .09 .06 .14 .09 .16 .22 .13 .26 -.15  
19. Number of products 1.29 1.60 .36 .04 .02 -.25 -.05 .05 .01 -.08 .25 .13 .30 -.03 .20 .27 .31 -.02 .05 .57 
Pearson correlation coefficients (1-tailed), indicating significant correlations (p<.05) in bold. 
a
 Correlations of binary variables should be interpreted with care. 
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Second, for the dichotomous dependent variables (“patent filed” and “product launched”), 
we used Cox proportional hazard models. Cox proportional hazard models are frequently used 
for event-history analysis with censored data. In our analyses, the event takes into account the 
occurrence of either a product introduction or patent filing while estimating the effect of other 
variables. The cases are however right censored, as some firms may not have either products 
or patent filings by the end of the observation period. The dependent variable in this study 
then becomes the waiting time before the event takes place. In Table 4-2, we therefore report 
hazard ratios for the variables in models 1 and 3. A hazard ratio greater than 1 implies that the 
variable reduces the waiting time until the event, while a hazard ratio lower than 1 points to 
an increase in the waiting time. 
In addition, as we excluded firms without an outside board from our analysis, selectivity 
biases may drive our results. In order to assure that our results are not affected by such biases, 
we applied Lee’s (1983) generalization of Heckman’s (1979) two–stage estimator. 
Specifically, we estimated a selectivity model using a logit analysis and used the selection 
variable derived from it as an instrument in the further analyses. The selectivity model used 
outside board formation (dummy) as a dependent variable, and, in line with previous research 
(e.g. Clarysse, Knockaert & Lockett, 2007), firm age, sector dummies, a VC dummy and 
TMT size as independents. The selectivity model was statistically significant and pointed to 
VC presence affecting the likelihood of outside board establishment. We used the results from 
this model to compute the selectivity instrument (also called Mills ratio), which is included in 
our models (and labeled “selectivity instrument”).  
 
4.5. RESULTS 
The results are presented in Table 4-2. All models are statistically significant. Variance 
Inflation Factors are all below 4 (max. 3.18; average 1.90), indicating that multicollinearity is 
not an issue (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tahal, 2006). 
 
In each of the full models, adding outside board human capital to the base models led to 
significant improvements. First, we assess the impact of specific outside board experience on 
firm performance. We find no indication of a positive impact of R&D experience on either 
time to first patent filing (model 1) or number of patents filed (model 2). We further find that 
higher levels of outside board marketing and sales experience does significantly affects speed 
to first product (model 3) and leads to more products on the market (model 4). Hence, the 
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results provide no support for H1a and support H1b. Second, we evaluate the impact of 
outside board diversity on our performance variables. We do not find a significant impact on 
waiting times to first patent filing (model 1), but find that outside board diversity negatively 
affects the number of patent filings (model 2). As expected, we find that higher levels of 
outside board diversity lead to shorter waiting times to first product (model 3) just as more 
products on the market (model 4). Thus our evidence partially supports H2a and fully 
supports H2b. Finally, we assess the impact of outside board tenure on ESHTF performance. 
We find that outside board tenure has a significant positive impact on (i.e. reduces) waiting 
time till first patent filed (model 1) and on the number of patent filings (model 2). Moreover, 
the impact of outside board tenure on the time to first product is not statistically significant 
(model 3), though significantly positive for the number of products (model 4). As such, we 
find full support for H3a and partial support for H3b. 
 
4.5.1. Post hoc analyses and robustness checks 
We conducted a number of post hoc analyses to assess the robustness of our results and to 
provide more fine-grained insights. First, we used outside board size as a proxy for outside 
board human capital. Replacing the outside board human capital measures by outside board 
size shows that outside board size has a significantly positive impact on the number of patent 
filings and on the market performance. While this asserts the assumption that larger outside 
boards bring more human capital and subsequently enhance firm performance, it also shows 
that by unfolding outside board size into core human capital variables, such as specific 
experience, diversity and tenure, more fine-grained results can be obtained. Second, if outside 
board members are indeed part of the “extended TMT” (Vanaelst et al., 2006), we can expect 
that the specific experience, diversity and tenure of this extended TMT – incorporating both 
TMT and outside board human capital – will affect performance. Replacing outside board and 
TMT human capital with the combined measures, largely confirms this assertion. We find that 
extended TMT diversity has a significantly negative impact on technological performance. 
Longer extended TMT tenure is beneficial for the number of patent filings and the number of 
products. Lastly, extended TMT marketing and sales experience and diversity lead to superior 
market performance, thereby endorsing the results of our main model. These outcomes 
highlight the value of looking beyond the limited TMT human capital when studying the link 
between TMT and firm performance. 
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Table 4-2 Results of Cox proportional hazard models and pooled regression analyses 
 
Time to first patent 
filed: Model 1 
Number of patent filings: 
Model 2 
Time to first 
product: Model 3 
Number of products: 
Model 4 
Base 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Base 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Base 
model 
Full 
Model 
Base 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Control         
Constant - - 
4.38*** 
(.96) 
1.53*** 
(.32) 
- - 
.21 
(.23) 
.34* 
(.14) 
Firm age (ln) - - 
.53 
(.31) 
-.26 
(.26) 
- - 
.57*** 
(.05) 
.35*** 
(.05) 
Firm independence 
.94 
(.34) 
1.18 
(.48) 
-3.06*** 
(.53) 
-1.99*** 
(.34) 
.99 
(.28) 
.80 
(.22) 
-.29*** 
(.04) 
-.43*** 
(.08) 
ICT industry 
.67 
(.31) 
.65 
(.33) 
-.91*** 
(.21) 
-.47* 
(.19) 
.99 
(.19) 
1.14 
(.21) 
-.49*** 
(.06) 
-.42*** 
(.02) 
Health & life sciences 
industry 
2.48 
(1.49) 
2.12 
(1.44) 
1.06 
(1.69) 
1.29 
(1.65) 
.11** 
(.09) 
.11** 
(.09) 
-1.36*** 
(.13) 
-1.42*** 
(.15) 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
1.04 
(.05) 
1.07 
(.05) 
-.09 
(.06) 
.00 
(.05) 
.98 
(.03) 
.99 
(.03) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
CEO duality 
.64 
(.24) 
.63 
(.24) 
.21 
(.56) 
-.08 
(.56) 
1.35 
(.28) 
1.32 
(.25) 
.28*** 
(.04) 
.22*** 
(.03) 
VC ownership 
1.51 
(.66) 
1.34 
(.68) 
.00 
(.54) 
-.07 
(.37) 
.69 
(.24) 
.46* 
(.15) 
.02* 
(.09) 
.07 
(.08) 
TMT R&D experience 
1.01 
(.01) 
1.01 
(.00) 
.02 
(.03) 
.01 
(.02) 
.99 
(.01) 
.99 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
TMT marketing and 
sales experience 
1.02 
(.02) 
1.02 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.01 
(.03) 
1.02 
(.02) 
1.03 
(.02) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
TMT diversity 
.79 
(.31) 
.83 
(.32) 
-.02 
(.35) 
.21 
(.29) 
1.53 
(.35) 
1.32 
(.29) 
.29* 
(.11) 
.13 
(.12) 
TMT tenure 
.96 
(.04) 
.94 
(.04) 
.14*** 
(.02) 
.06*** 
(.00) 
.99 
(.04) 
.98 
(.04) 
.01*** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Selectivity instrument 
.70 
(.74) 
.61 
(.68) 
-3.31*** 
(.81) 
-3.01*** 
(.57) 
1.83 
(1.01) 
.96 
(.65) 
.80 
(.23) 
.22 
(.24) 
Independent         
Outside board R&D 
experience 
 
1.00 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.01) 
 
1.01 
(.01) 
 
-.02*** 
(.01) 
Outside board 
marketing and sales 
experience 
 
.95 
(.03) 
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
 
1.02* 
(.01) 
 
.02* 
(.01) 
Outside board 
diversity  
 
1.03 
(.38) 
 
-.79* 
(.35) 
 
2.18** 
(.50) 
 
.66** 
(.21) 
Outside board tenure  
1.05* 
(.03) 
 
.15*** 
(.02) 
 
.99 
(.03) 
 
.03*** 
(.01) 
No. of observations 419 419 482 482 254 254 482 482 
No. of groups 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
R² - - .2243 .2673 - - .2439 .3208 
F-statistic - - 8929366*** 2844.26*** - - 6369.87*** 7036.65*** 
Chi² 39.93*** 50.10*** - - 43.22*** 83.11*** - - 
Significance levels:*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; N=562 
Models 1 and 3: hazard ratios of the Cox proportional hazard models are displayed. 
Please note that, even though we also have 562 firm-year observations for the Cox analyses, these observations are 
not further considered by the models once respectively a first product has been shipped or a first patent has been 
filed in any previous year. 
Models 2 and 4: coefficients of the panel regression analyses are displayed. 
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4.6. DISCUSSION 
Building on team production and human capital theories, we examined the fit between 
outside board human capital and ESHTF performance, whilst controlling for TMT human 
capital. An important premise of our study is that outside boards, which perform a service role 
in this context, can be considered part of the “extended TMT”. We further acknowledged that 
ESHTFs may choose between competing on the market for ideas or the market for products 
(Gans & Stern, 2003) and as such we differentiated between technological performance and 
market performance. The consistent main finding of this study is that the outside boards’ 
human capital is significantly related to the performance of ESHTFs but that the human 
capital profile of outside boards that positively contribute to technological performance looks 
different to that of outside boards that contribute positively to market performance. 
First, although it is known that task performance improves when more specific human 
capital is attributed to the task being performed (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005), our results show 
this only holds for ESHTFs seeking market performance. In this case, it is useful to 
incorporate outside board members with higher levels of marketing and sales experience. 
However, higher levels of outside board R&D experience do not significantly affect 
technological performance. Since ESHTFs consider technological innovation to be their 
lifeblood (Acs & Audretsch, 1990), they need sustained and regular input into the technology 
development process and may incorporate such core technological knowledge in the TMT. 
The value added by outside board members who meet with the TMT less frequently, 
therefore, may be limited. 
Second, outside board diversity is not universally beneficial to ESHTFs. Our findings 
suggest that they benefit from the heterogeneous human capital brought by a diverse outside 
board when pursuing market performance. In contrast, less diverse outside boards appear to 
favor companies seeking superior technological performance. This is because the 
communication and information integration needed to develop a technological (i.e. patent) 
strategy are more likely to be available within homogeneous groups. 
Finally, we argued that, irrespective of the strategy a company follows, it benefits from 
having higher levels of outside board tenure. As outside board members continue to reside on 
the board for a longer period, they build firm-specific human capital, enabling them to make 
more valuable contributions to team production and to provide more tailored advice to the 
TMT. Our results show that outside board tenure is beneficial to technological performance, 
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whereas its impact on market performance is more nuanced; tenure positively affects the 
number of products, but not necessarily the speed to first product. 
 
4.6.1. Implications for theory 
By responding to calls by Nielsen (2010) and Machold et al. (2011) to study boards and 
TMTs together, our research makes a number of contributions to the entrepreneurship, 
corporate governance and group processes literatures. First, our study has implications for the 
(early stage high-tech) entrepreneurship literature by further nuancing our understanding of 
the relationship between human capital and firm performance. While we offer further support 
for the important role played by human capital in explaining new venture performance, we 
also highlight that rather than concentrating solely on the human capital of the TMT, it is also 
valuable to consider the human capital of the outside board. At the same time, with respect to 
the performance of ESHTFs, our results attest to the importance of aligning performance 
measures with firm strategy.  
Second, our study contributes to the corporate governance literature. This body of research 
has studied the link between outside board composition and performance in large, established 
ventures, but has largely neglected to examine this relationship in ESHTFs, wherein the 
outside board extensively engages in a service role. Our study provides an opportunity to 
assess the value of (the relatively new) team production theory as applied to the setting of 
(high-tech) entrepreneurial firms. We show that the outside board can indeed operate as a 
“mediating hierarchy” (Blair & Stout, 1999) facilitating team production (i.e. firm 
performance). At the same time, by studying outside boards in the hitherto largely overlooked 
setting of ESHTFs, we are also able to contribute to the development of team production 
theory itself. Specifically, by demonstrating that the outside board’s ability to contribute to 
performance (i.e. team production) is dependent on its human capital profile as well as the 
type of performance being pursued, we offer insights into the boundary conditions of this 
theory. Exploring existing theories in new settings allows us to know more about the 
boundaries of these theories and their robustness, in turn allowing us to assess the usefulness 
of focal theories (Zahra & Newey, 2009). 
Finally, our study contributes to the group processes literature by providing insights into 
the contingent effects of diversity. Specifically, when firms play on a market for ideas, outside 
board diversity may be detrimental, whereas it may be valuable for firms playing on a market 
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for products. As a result, our study helps to explain the contradicting results found in diversity 
studies (Jackson, Joshi & Erhardt, 2003). 
 
4.6.2. Implications for practice 
Our research has implications for high-tech entrepreneurial ventures and their stakeholders, 
such as TMTs and outside board members. First, we show that setting up a well composed 
outside board early on is useful as longer outside board tenure tended to lead to increased firm 
performance. Further, we suggest that considerable attention should be given to the 
establishment of an outside board that is aligned with the company’s strategy. Specifically, 
our findings suggest that, when firms compete on a market for ideas, in which they often do 
not market products themselves but are seeking to develop a technology platform, a less 
diverse outside board incorporating higher levels of R&D experience may be advantageous. If 
ESHTFs are competing on a market for products, they are better off building diverse outside 
boards and outside boards that contain higher levels of marketing and sales experience. Our 
results are also relevant to policy makers. Although many governments have built schemes to 
assist firms in attracting outside board members (Conyon, Peck & Read, 2001), our research 
emphasizes the need for a more tailored approach when supporting high-tech entrepreneurs; 
the process of attaining new outside board members should take into account, and aim to align 
outside board characteristics with the ESHTF’s strategy.  
 
4.6.3. Limitations and directions for future research 
While our study is the first to consider the relationship between outside board human 
capital and ESHTF performance, it has a number of limitations which point to future research 
opportunities. First, our findings build on a sample of companies established in one country. 
While exclusively focusing on Belgium ensured that we could survey a large percentage of 
the population, it has the disadvantage that the results could be more difficult to generalize to 
other countries. Future studies could therefore analyze the extent to which our results hold in 
other international contexts. Second, while our longitudinal research deliberately focused on 
the added value of outside board human capital, it would be interesting to reveal the processes 
through which the outside board deploys its human capital to enhance firm performance. 
Future research could purposefully use qualitative or observational designs to uncover 
underlying board mechanisms (e.g. nature of communication in board meetings). Finally, we 
studied the relationship between outside board human capital and firm performance. Future 
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research could complement this study by assessing the impact of outside board human capital 
on particular firm behavior and decisions, such as internationalization, business models or 
mergers and acquisitions. Alternatively, future studies could assess how other internal (e.g. 
ownership distribution, CEO duality) and external (e.g. competitive rivalry, environmental 
turbulence) contingencies affect the outside board-performance relationship.  
 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examined the impact of outside board human capital on ESHTF 
performance whilst controlling for the human capital of the TMT. Our study’s findings 
suggest that ventures operating in the “market for ideas” may need to structure their outside 
boards differently as compared to their counterparts operating in the “market for products”. 
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this dissertation was to provide insights into the service role of the 
outside board members for early stage high-tech firms. Where the first and second study drew 
upon cross-sectional data, the third paper employed a longitudinal data design. Furthermore, a 
mixture of statistical analyses was used, including mediation analysis, hierarchical regression, 
cox proportional hazard models and pooled regression, in order to build a model for 
understanding the outside board members’ involvement, effectiveness, and link with firm 
performance in an early stage high-tech environment. This final chapter summarizes the main 
findings of the three studies, outlines the key academic contributions, highlights the practical 
implications and suggests avenues for further research. 
 
5.1. MAIN FINDINGS 
The first study explored outside board service involvement. Particularly, the interpersonal 
dynamics between the outside board and the TMT were investigated. Building on conflict 
theory, we focused on the influence of task conflict between the TMT and the outside board. 
Combining linear regression and mediation analysis, and using a sample of 70 early stage 
high-tech firms with both a TMT and outside board in place, we found that task conflict 
between these decision-making entities resulted in higher outside board service involvement. 
We did not observe a curvilinear effect, which could be due to our sample of early stage high-
tech firms, which may be so resource-dependent that any intervention by the outside board is 
deemed to contribute, irrespective of the level of task conflict it brings. Moreover, this 
relationship was indirectly influenced by TMT – outside board relationship conflict. As such, 
both TMT and outside board need to avoid task conflict from spilling over into relationship 
conflict. 
 
The second paper studied the outside board service effectiveness, and particularly how 
effective the TMT perceives the service involvement of the outside board. Drawing upon 
learning theory and the attention-based view, this study explored which learning components 
and contingencies affect the effectiveness of the outside board’s service interventions. Our 
findings were based on a dataset of 89 early stage high-tech firms. First, we provided 
empirical evidence that both the learning capabilities of the TMT as well as the frequency of 
interaction between outside board and TMT significantly improve the outside board service 
effectiveness. Moreover, our analysis highlighted that outside board functional diversity was 
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related to higher levels of outside board service effectiveness when CEO duality was in place, 
or when the firm was performing below expectations.  
 
In the third study, we identified which aspects of outside board human capital matter to 
which aspects of early stage high-tech firm performance, building upon team production and 
human capital theory. In so doing, we distinguished between market and technological 
performance. Our findings were based on a longitudinal panel dataset of 80 early stage high-
tech firms, of which we had information since their founding. Through the use of cox 
proportional hazard models and pooled regression analyses, we demonstrated that the outside 
board’s human capital is significantly related to the performance of early stage high-tech 
firms. However, the human capital profile of outside boards that positively contribute to 
technological performance looks different from that of outside boards that contribute 
positively to market performance. Early stage high-tech firms seeking technological 
performance may benefit from having a less functionally diverse outside board, whose 
members stay on the board for a longer period. Alternatively, those ventures pursuing market 
performance may benefit from having outside board members with specific marketing and 
sales experience, who continue to reside on the board for a longer period and whose 
functional experience is quite diverse. 
 
5.2. ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
The dissertation primarily makes a number of contributions to the corporate governance 
and entrepreneurship literatures. 
 
First, both corporate governance and entrepreneurship literatures have mainly focused on 
the control tasks of the outside board, often in large corporations (e.g. Conyon & Peck, 1998). 
Yet, the outside board service tasks are equally important, definitely in early stage (high-tech) 
ventures, where advice, strategic input, and network access are crucial (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Huse, 2007) given the encountered liabilities of newness and smallness (Henderson, 
1999), the gaps in their TMT human capital bases (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005), and the 
demanding and rapidly changing environment they are operating in (Zahra & George, 2002). 
Specifically, the first study provides insights into the service involvement of the outside board 
and the second study centers on the effectiveness of the outside board service interventions. 
As such, this dissertation gives a more fine-grained understanding of how (effective) outside 
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boards contribute through their service participation. Additionally, by differentiating between 
outside board involvement and effectiveness, this doctoral thesis responds to a recent call by 
Machold and Farquhar (2013) to consider these concepts as distinct, hence recognizing the 
difference between which service tasks the outside board accomplishes and which 
interventions matter the most. 
 
Second, in order to better understand the service participation of the outside board, we go 
beyond merely studying outside board demographics (or “the usual suspects”) in explaining 
the outside board service involvement and effectiveness, and subsequently firm performance. 
Following Zona and Zattoni (2007), this dissertation contributes by opening up the black box 
of outside board demographics as such adding to the current state-of-the art which mainly 
constitutes of input-output studies. Particularly, outside board interpersonal relationships 
rather than demographics have the greatest influence on outside board service involvement 
(Neill & Dulewicz, 2010). Given that the interactions between the outside board and the TMT 
may influence the functioning of the outside board (Kor, 2006), the first study unfolds 
conflict-related interpersonal dynamics between TMT and outside board in understanding 
outside board service involvement. Furthermore, the usual suspects do not provide 
understanding of how the outside board can contribute to organizational value creation 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2007). Therefore, the second study examines what 
drives outside board service effectiveness by unraveling the situations and contexts in which 
outside board capital is beneficial to such effectiveness. Subsequently, given that corporate 
governance literature has typically looked at large, established ventures, the third study takes 
the opportunity to explain the influence of outside board human capital (above and beyond the 
human capital of the TMT) in early stage high-tech firms, as such demonstrating that the 
outside board’s ability to contribute to early stage high-tech firm performance is dependent on 
its human capital profile.  
 
Third, this dissertation contributes by integrating the TMT, often studied in 
entrepreneurship studies, and the outside board, often addressed in the corporate governance 
literature. Pettigrew (1992) argued that research on boards should be incorporated with studies 
on the TMT, given that these can be considered a collective working together to reach a firm’s 
full potential. Moreover, this definitely holds in an early stage high-tech environment, where 
outside boards and TMTs can be seen as “collective entrepreneurs” (Zhang, Baden-Fuller & 
Pool, 2011). Hence, this dissertation responds to several calls to study outside boards and 
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TMTs together instead of considering them as standalone entities (Carpenter, Pollock & 
Leary, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Nielsen, 2010; Machold, 
Huse, Minichilli & Nordqvist, 2011), as such extending both literatures in multiple ways. 
Specifically, the first study shows that interpersonal dynamics between TMT and outside 
board may impact the outside board service involvement. The second paper explains that in 
order to understand outside board service effectiveness, both TMT and outside board 
characteristics are important. Lastly, the third study highlights that rather than concentrating 
solely on the human capital of the TMT, it is also valuable to consider the human capital of 
the outside board in explaining new venture performance. 
 
Fourth, by investigating outside boards in the largely overlooked setting of early stage 
high-tech firms, this doctoral research indicates that the outside board’s ability to continue 
performance is dependent on the pursued type of performance. Particularly the results of the 
third study attest to the importance of aligning performance measures with firm strategy. 
Moreover, traditional measures of new venture financial performance such as growth and 
business volume may be less appropriate for early stage high-tech firms (Chandler & Hanks, 
1993) as they might be loss making while developing market presence (Dai & Liu, 2009). 
Therefore, this dissertation also adds to the entrepreneurship literature by identifying more 
appropriate performance factors for early stage high-tech firms, depending on whether the 
ventures strive for technological or market performance. 
 
In parallel, the collection of papers integrates other theoretical lenses and concepts in the 
study of corporate governance and entrepreneurship. As such, each study of the dissertation 
additionally contributes to a different kind of research stream. The first study enriches the 
conflict literature by gaining a better insight into the association between task and relationship 
conflict and their direct and indirect effect on group involvement. Moreover, while both types 
of conflict have mainly been studied in an intragroup setting (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), our 
research shows that it is beneficial to investigate conflict in an intergroup context, i.e. between 
organizational decision-making groups. The second paper enhances the learning literature by 
further exploring learning concept at the team level, where we consider the TMT as the 
“student” and the outside board as the “teacher” (Audretsch & Stephan, 1996). Additionally, 
we contribute by showing that the attention based view can purposefully complement the 
learning theory given the significance of both structural and situational attention mechanisms. 
Lastly, the third study assesses the value of team production theory as applied to the setting of 
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high-tech entrepreneurial firms. We exemplify that the outside board can indeed operate as a 
“mediating hierarchy” (Blair & Stout, 1999), facilitating team production (i.e. firm 
performance). Moreover, by illustrating that this propensity is dependent on the outside board 
human capital profile and the type of performance being pursued, we offer insights into the 
boundary conditions of this theory. 
 
5.3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, we discuss the implications of the dissertation for high-tech entrepreneurs, 
outside board members and their stakeholders, such as venture capitalists. Additionally, our 
research is also relevant to policy makers. 
 
First, this doctoral research calls for increased attention to the formation of the board since 
outside board members have the potential to add value not just by monitoring the company, 
but also by performing their service tasks. Attracting outside board members may be 
particularly pertinent to early stage high-tech firms, as they are likely to enhance the firm 
performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). We suggest that considerable attention should be given 
to the establishment of an outside board that is aligned with the company’s strategy. 
Specifically, when entrepreneurial high-tech firms compete on a market for ideas, in which 
they often do not market products themselves but are seeking to develop a technology 
platform, a less diverse outside board incorporating higher levels of R&D experience may be 
advantageous. If early stage high-tech ventures are competing on a market for products, they 
are better off building diverse outside boards and outside boards that contain higher levels of 
marketing and sales experience. Further, this dissertation provides evidence that while 
composing the board of directors, entrepreneurs should carefully evaluate and target outside 
board members who match their own needs and those of the firm. Having experienced outside 
board members is crucial, but the TMT must also consider its own competences, skills and 
human capital base. In order to benefit from the outside board’s engagement in the service 
tasks, the entrepreneurial TMT itself should also have sufficient absorptive capacity to be able 
to comprehend the information provided by the outside board.  
 
Second, next to having qualified outside board members, specific structural and contextual 
factors need to be taken into account in order to reach outside board service effectiveness. As 
outside board members often hold multiple board positions (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 
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2003), they have to distribute their time over these positions. Therefore, if they are kept 
informed by the CEO-chair and are triggered by the firm’s underperformance, highly diverse 
outside boards become more engaged in their service tasks. Additionally, the importance of 
interactions and discussions between TMT and outside board should not be neglected. 
Primary, face-to-face interaction between these two decision-making bodies enables them to 
share relevant knowledge, which allows the TMT to value the outside board’s engagement in 
its service tasks. Further, in stimulating both parties to share different perspectives, conflicts 
among TMT and outside board may arise. Consequently, we reveal that the participants in 
such discussions should be cautious in order to avoid task conflict from spilling over into 
relationship conflict. Therefore, it is important to make sure that discussions are not perceived 
as personal critique. For example, harmonious personal relationships are highly important in 
minimizing relationship conflict (Neill & Dulewicz, 2010). 
 
Finally, this dissertation offers insights to policy makers to be better able to guide the board 
of directors in improving organizational functioning. Partly due to the governmental efforts to 
compose corporate governance codes, organizations have been convinced of the importance 
to integrate and apply these recommendations. However, additional actions might be required 
to achieve good – or even better – corporate governance and to enable the outside board 
members to create value for the firm. Code Buysse, for example, still provides rather general 
recommendations as such failing to incorporate the broad range of types of private firms and 
their strong mixture of governance needs (Uhlaner, Wright & Huse, 2007).  Hence, although 
many governments have built schemes to assist firms in attracting outside board members 
(Conyon, Peck & Read, 2001), this doctoral research emphasizes the need for a more tailored 
approach when supporting high-tech entrepreneurs. We resonate the call by Bjornali and 
Gulbransen (2010) to support new ventures by establishing and financing networks of outside 
board members. This process of attaining new outside board members should take into 
account and aim at aligning outside board characteristics with the entrepreneurial high-tech 
firm’s strategy, and should consider the learning capabilities of the TMT in order for outside 
board interventions to reach their full potential. Additionally, next to the importance of 
assisting the entrepreneurial firm in selecting outside board members, constituting guidelines 
for outside board evaluation might be essential. Hence, early stage high-tech firms get the 
opportunity to become more professionalized and will obtain a better insight into the outside 
board effectiveness, which enables them to learn and improve, and subsequently deliver high-
class outcomes.   
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5.4. AVENUE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This dissertation has explored a relatively understudied area within the domain of 
governance in entrepreneurial firms, namely the influence of outside board members in early 
stage high-tech firms. While the results of the empirical papers provide new insights into the 
corporate governance and entrepreneurship literatures by thoroughly investigating the service 
involvement and effectiveness of the outside board, and subsequently the influence of the 
outside board human capital profile on firm performance, these studies are not without 
insufficiencies. In this final section, we elaborate on main limitations of the dissertation and 
discuss some avenues for future research. 
 
A first limitation may be situated in the generalizability of the results to other populations 
or situations. Our findings build on a sample of companies established in one country. While 
exclusively focusing on Belgium ensured that face-to-face interviews with the CEO could be 
organized and that we could survey a large percentage of the early stage high-tech population, 
it has the disadvantage that the results might be more difficult to generalize to other countries. 
Future studies could therefore analyze the extent to which our findings hold in other 
international contexts, where different regulations related to board composition and 
functioning may apply. Moreover, while the outside board service tasks are particularly 
important in an early stage high-tech environment, it could be interesting to study whether our 
outcomes withstand in larger and more established organizational settings, in which firms 
may be less dependent on the outside board service participation. 
 
Second, not all studies in this dissertation took a longitudinal approach. Hence, it would be 
very interesting to follow-up the identified early stage high-tech ventures in order to further 
explore how the examined outside board concepts evolve throughout the start-up process, as 
such being able to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects. Specifically, it would 
be of great interest to use qualitative or observational research design to further uncover the 
underlying board mechanisms. In particular, given that our results point to the importance of 
face-to-face interactions, the nature of communication in board meetings would be thought-
provoking, as such revealing the processes through which the outside board deploys its human 
capital base to perform its service tasks and to subsequently enhance firm performance. 
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Third, future research could assess how other internal and external contingencies affect 
outside board service functioning and the outside board-performance relationship. Internally, 
the specific role of the board chair could be of great consequence. He or she sets the agenda, 
has a strong liaison with the CEO and – most importantly – is responsible for board 
leadership, as such being able to impact the outside board service participation to a larger 
extent given his/her impact on board dynamics (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2006; 
Vandewaerde, Voordeckers, Lambrechts & Bammens, 2011). Additionally, the effects of 
ownership distribution and the remuneration policy, as well as specific characteristics of the 
outside board members, such as their cognitive styles, could shed a different light on the 
outside board service involvement, effectiveness and ultimately firm performance. 
Furthermore, organizational behavior scholars underlined the importance of subgroup 
behavior and the faultlines concept (Bezrukova, Thatcher, Jehn & Spell, 2012). Applied to our 
research setting, hypothetical dividing lines may be present between TMT and outside board 
members. Hence, given that little is known about the impact of faultiness on (board) 
performance (Almandoz, 2012), it may be worthwhile to further investigate this research 
concept. Important external contingencies might be the competitive intensity and 
environmental turbulence. In an early stage high-tech setting, the occurrence of external 
unforeseen events may possibly have a direct impact on the functioning of the outside board 
and the necessary competences of the outside board members. 
 
Fourth, this doctoral research specifically centers around understanding the determinants 
and outcomes of outside board service tasks. Nevertheless, outside board members also carry 
out control tasks as part of their ‘duty of care’ towards the company (Blair, 2012). Although 
this dissertation provides novel insights into the outside board service participation, future 
research may benefit from integrating outside board service and control tasks, as such 
incorporating different theoretical perspectives and identifying the inter-relationship between 
these functions (Hung, 1998; Pugliese, Minichilli & Zattoni, 2014). Additionally, the different 
sets of tasks can be further specified within this broader definition (Minichilli, Zattoni & 
Zona, 2009). By applying the alternative board task typology suggested by Huse (2007), 
follow-up studies will be able to provide an in depth understanding of the specific 
characteristics of the sub-tasks. 
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